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INTRODUCTION
The intellectual foundations of nonreciprocal preferences were first laid
out in the 1960s, as several scholars noted developing countries' increasing
reliance on highly volatile, low-value-added exports like agricultural and min-
eral commodities.' The Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which
became the mechanism for implementing nonreciprocal preferential market
access, was developed in this context.2 GSP was envisioned as part of a
larger development strategy that included import-substitution policies, infant
industry protection, and preferential access to developed countries' mar-
kets. 3 As GSP granted preferential access over World Trade Organization
(WTO) most favored nation (MFN) rates, development economists antici-
pated that it would provide developing countries' economies with the
* J.D., University of Michigan Law School; B.A. Biology, Greenville College. I
would like to thank the editors and staff of the Michigan Journal of International Law for their
hard work and editorial contributions. In particular, I would like to thank my Note Editor, Sa-
rah Baumgartner, for her patience and feedback throughout the writing of this Note. Thanks as
well to Professor Simon Lester and Ms. Michiko Hayashi for their insightful comments on
previous drafts.
1. See Qaglar Ozden & Eric Reinhardt, Unilateral Preference Programs: The Evi-
dence, in ECONoMic DEVELOPMENT AND MULTILATERAL TRADE COOPERATION 189, 191-92
(Simon J. Evenett & Bernand M. Hoekman eds., 2006).
2. Id. at 192.
3. Id.
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competitive edge they needed to diversify and grow. 4 Dr. Supachai Pa-
nitchpakdi, current Secretary-General of the U.N. Conference on Trade and
Development and former Director-General of the WTO, summarized the
purpose behind GSP as follows:
The [Generalized System of Preferences] was established on the
basis of the economic theory that preferential tariff rates in devel-
oped-country markets could promote export-driven industry growth
in developing countries. It was believed that this, in turn, would
help free beneficiaries from heavy dependence on trade in primary
products, the slow long-term growth and price instability of which
contributed to chronic trade deficits. It was thought that only the
larger markets of industrialized trading partners were big enough to
provide the economic stimulus needed to attain these goals.
5
At present, thirteen countries or groups of countries have established GSP
schemes6 and, despite criticism over the discretionary and conditional nature
of some of these countries' schemes," commentators acknowledge that
nonreciprocal preferences have had a positive effect on development and
economic growth in beneficiary countries.8 Despite their positive impact,
however, nonreciprocal preference programs have met resistance in some
countries. In the United States, for instance, continuation of U.S. GSP was
4. Supachai Panitchpakdi, Introduction to Part IV GATE, in WTO-TRADE IN GOODS
766, 770 (Ruidiger Wolfrum et al. eds., 2010).
5. Id.
6. According to the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), a U.N.
body tasked with monitoring trade and development issues, the following countries have im-
plemented GSP schemes: Australia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Estonia, the European Union
(EU), Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Switzerland, Turkey, and the
United States. About GSP, UNCTAD.oRG, http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?
intltemlD=2309&lang=l (last visited June 7, 2012).
7. See Ozden & Reinhardt, supra note 1, at 192-93.
8. See, e.g., Paul Collier & Anthony J. Venables, Rethinking Trade Preferences: How
Africa Can Diversify Its Exports, 30 WORLD ECON. 1326, 1329 (2007) (indicating that US.
GSP's impact on economic growth and development of beneficiaries' nascent industries is
widely acknowledged); Garth Frazer & Johannes Van Biesebroeck, Trade Growth Under the
African Growth and Opportunity Act 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
13222, 2007), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w13222 (finding that the African
Growth and Opportunity Act [AGOA], a U.S. nonreciprocal preference program designed to
help sub-Saharan African countries, has had a significant positive impact on its beneficiaries'
apparel, agricultural, and manufactured imports to the United States); Douglas Lippoldt &
Przemyslaw Kowalski, Trade Preference Erosion: Potential Economic Impacts 11-12 (Org.
for Econ. Co-operation & Dev. [OECD], Trade Policy Working Paper No. 17, 2005) (citing
previous studies that show the positive impact that nonreciprocal preference programs can
have on production in beneficiary countries); Rosa Whitaker, Trade Talk-Don't Mischarac-
terize AGOA, It's Working!, ALLAFRICA (Aug. 25, 2010), http://allafrica.com/




recently the subject of a prolonged and contentious Congressional debate.9
Moreover, given the widespread effects of the global economic recession,' °
policy makers may face increasing pressure to evaluate whether the
potential benefits of nonreciprocal preference programs justify their costs. II
Such an evaluation is advisable. Its findings could streamline nonrecip-
rocal preference programs and improve how they function. 12 Removing
eligibility for imports with few realized benefits would increase tariff reve-
nue and free up economic resources that could be used to improve market
access for other, more important imports. 3 Oil products, for example, result in
relatively few developmental benefits, but they consistently account for a sig-
nificant percentage of imports under some countries' nonreciprocal preference
9. See VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33663, GENERALIZED SYSTEM
OF PREFERENCES: BACKGROUND AND RENEWAL DEBATE 23-27 (2011); TAA, ATPDEA Re-
newal Remains Mired in Controversy in House, Senate, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 18, 2011.
10. See, e.g., Jackie Calmes, Obama's Budget Focuses on Path to Rein in Deficit, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 14, 2011, atAl.
11. As a result of lost tariff revenue, U.S. GSP was estimated to cost U.S. taxpayers
around $992 million between 2007 and 2009. Lost tariff revenue from AGOA is estimated to
total around $180 million from 2007 to 2016. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE [GAO],
GAO-08-443, U.S. TRADE BENEFITS PROVIDE IMPORTANT BENEFITS, BUT A MORE INTEGRAT-
ED APPROACH WOULD BETTER ENSURE PROGRAMS MEET SHARED GOALS 13-14 (2008). Some
members of the U.S. Congress have also expressed legitimate concerns that continued nonre-
ciprocal preferential market access may create a disincentive for beneficiary countries to
negotiate reciprocal free trade agreements with the United States. Id. at 44. Other concerns
regarding the negative effects of nonreciprocal preference programs, however, may be exag-
gerated. Further liberalization of nonreciprocal preferences, for instance, will not necessarily
result in a significant reduction in domestic employment. In fact, both national and local lead-
ers in the United States have argued that U.S. nonreciprocal preference programs can benefit
U.S. businesses and consumers. See, e.g., id. at 9-12 (listing consumer savings from duty-free
market access); Alex Penelas, Trade with Africa: A Great Opportunity for Miami-Dade Coun-
ty, 10 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 1, 2 (2001-2002) (stating, as mayor,
that Florida's Miami-Dade County stands to benefit from AGOA). AGOA, in particular, is es-
timated to have created around three hundred thousand jobs since its inception. Whitaker,
supra note 8. Moreover, nonreciprocal preference programs often have a relatively minor ef-
fect on a preference-granting country's economy, as they generally represent only a small
percentage of the country's total trade. In 2010, for instance, only 4% of U.S. imports entered
under nonreciprocal preference programs. VIVIAN C. JONES ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41429, TRADE PREFERENCES: ECONOMIC ISSUES AND POLICY OPTIONS 10 (2011).
12. It should be noted, however, that beneficiary countries' national policies, infrastruc-
ture, and capacity might also impede utilization of preferences. Although this Note does not
address the extent to which these concerns may play a role, for more information see Sub-
Saharan Africa: Effects of Infrastructure Conditions on Export Competitiveness, Third Annual
Report, USITC Pub. 4071, Inv. No. 332-477 (Apr. 2009), available at http://www.usitc.gov/
publications/332/pub4071 .pdf; Collier & Venables, supra note 8, at 1329.
13. See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Trade & Dev. [UNCTAD], Generalized System of
Preferences, Handbook on the Scheme of the United States of America, 29, U.N. Doc.
UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/Misc.58/Rev.2 (2010), available at http://archive.unctad.org/en/docs/
itcdtsbmisc58rev2_en.pdf (discussing U.S. budget rules requiring any proposed legislation to
offset increased expenditures or tariff reductions through tariff or tax increases or spending
cuts).
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programs. 4 On the other hand, expanding market access for agricultural
products and processed foods could result in significant benefits for
beneficiary countries) 5 While domestic political resistance may prevent im-
plementation of all potential reforms, at least some reforms will likely be
feasible.
In light of these issues, this Note will analyze how nonreciprocal pref-
erence schemes can be implemented more effectively. When applicable, it
will also evaluate the feasibility of potential reforms. Part I will provide
background on how nonreciprocal preferences became incorporated into the
WTO framework and will outline the requirements that a country must meet
when offering nonreciprocal preferences. Part II will then provide a brief
history and examples of how one country-the United States-has chosen to
implement its nonreciprocal preference scheme. Next, Part ElI will engage in a
similar analysis regarding the nonreciprocal preference scheme of another
group of countries-the European Union (EU). Using Parts II and Ell as case
studies, Part IV will then propose recommendations regarding the design of a
more effective nonreciprocal preference scheme. 16 Part IV will also evaluate
the feasibility of such reforms in light of certain political and economic real-
ities and, where necessary, suggest workable compromises. Lastly, this Note
will conclude by summarizing feasible modifications that would significant-
ly improve the functionality of nonreciprocal preference schemes.
I. NONRECIPROCAL PREFERENCES AND THE WTO FRAMEWORK
After decades of debate and negotiation, the WTO rules governing
nonreciprocal preferences have evolved into a permissible framework that
allows a great deal of variation. The modem international trade system is
14. See Malwina Nowakowska, Reform of the EU GSP Regime and Its Potential Impact
on Sub-Saharan Africa, in AFRICA RESISTS THE PROTECTIONIST TEMPTATION" THE 5TH GTA
REPORT 113, 129-30 (Simon J. Evenett ed., Global Trade Alert 2010), available at
http:llwww.globaltradealert.org/sites/default/files/GTA5_nowakowska.pdf; Whitaker, supra
note 8.
15. Paul Brenton & Mombert Hoppe, The African Growth and Opportunity Act, Ex-
ports, and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa 21 (World Bank Policy Research, Working
Paper No. 3996, 2006) (mentioning positive impacts on beneficiary-country exports that
would result from elimination of agricultural tariffs).
16. While this Note limits its recommendations to market access reforms, other types of
assistance, such as capacity-building support, technical assistance, and exchange of infor-
mation, should not be ignored. Many preference-granting countries, for instance, supplement
preferential market access with other assistance, including debt relief, technical assistance,
and capacity-building support. See Dries Lesage & Bart Kerremans, The Political Dynamics of
U.S. and EU Trade Initiatives Towards Least Developed Countries, in EUROPEAN UNION
TRADE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT: 'EVERYTHING BUT ARMS' UNRAVELLED 74, 75-76
(Gerrit Faber & Jan Orbie eds., 2007); see also DANIELLE LANGTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL31772, U.S. TRADE AND INVESTMENT RELATIONSHIP WITH SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA: THE
AFRICAN GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITY ACT AND BEYOND 13-14, 17-21 (2008); GAO, supra
note 11, at 55. For information on how certain other types of assistance have been implement-
ed, see LANGTON, supra, at 13-14, 17-21; GAO, supra note 11, at 55.
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based on reciprocity, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), the multilateral international trade agreement that preceded the
WTO, initially contained no provision authorizing special and differential
treatment. 17 However, increasing interest in development economics and the
emergence of a number of new, vulnerable states following decolonialism
led GATT contracting parties to soften some strict provisions of the GATT,
at least in the context of developing countries. 8 GATT Article XVIII, which
outlines permitted government assistance to nascent industries, was rewrit-
ten in 1955 to allow developing countries to enact measures to protect their
infant industries. 19 In addition, revisions to GATT Article XVIII allowed de-
veloping countries to more easily impose trade restrictions to remedy
balance-of-payments issues.20 GATT contracting parties also incorporated
certain nonbinding provisions into the GATT for the benefit of developing
countries. 21 For example, Article XXIIIbis, which sets out the framework for
future GATT negotiations, states that negotiations should take into account
"the needs of less-developed countries for a more flexible use of tariff pro-
tection to assist their economic development."
22
In 1971, GATT contracting parties moved a step further when they
waived obligations resulting from the GATE Article I(1) MFN provision "for
a period of [ten] years."23 In effect, this created a small exception in the
traditional reciprocal framework of the GATE: developed GATT contracting
parties could single out developing GATT contracting parties' products for
nonreciprocal preferential tariff treatment above and beyond that which was
granted to MFN trading partners.24 Contracting parties to the GATT more
clearly defined the framework for this exception during the Tokyo Round
negotiations in 1979.2 The resulting agreement, the Decision on Differential
and More Favourable Treatment, Reciprocity, and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries (the Enabling Clause),26 solidified nonreciprocal
17. Patricia Michelle Lenaghan, Trade Negotiations or Trade Capitulations: An African
Experience, 17 BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 117, 118 (2006).
18. Frank J. Garcia, Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMP.
L. RaV. 291, 294 (2004); see also Evdokia Moisd, Special and Differential Treatment in the
Area of Trade Facilitation 3 (OECD, Trade Policy Working Paper No. 32, 2006) (mentioning
static differentiation between developed and developing countries under the GATr).
19. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. XVIII, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55
U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]; Garcia, supra note 18, at 294.
20. Garcia, supra note 18, at 294.
21. Id. (discussing the addition of Part IV of the GAIT).
22. Id. (citing GATT art. XXVIllbis(3)(b)).
23. Lenaghan, supra note 17, at 118.
24. Kevin Moss, Note, The Consequences of the WTO Appellate Body Decision in
EC-Tariff Preferences for the African Growth Opportunity Act and Sub-Saharan Africa, 38
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 665,669-70 (2006).
25. Lenaghan, supra note 17, at 118.
26. Differential and More Favourable Treatment Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of
Developing Countries, Nov. 28, 1979, GATT B.I.S.D. (26th Supp.) at 203-05 (1980).
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preferential treatment within the GATT and provided a permanent legal
basis for nonreciprocal preferences.2 7 The Enabling Clause also expanded
the scope of the 1971 waiver by permitting preferential treatment for
nontariff measures. 2s Lastly, by permitting selective treatment based on a
beneficiary's level of economic development, the Enabling Clause made it
possible for preference-granting countries to grant different levels of
preference to developing countries with different levels of economic
development.2 9 Thus, GATI contracting parties could now phase out
nonreciprocal preferences as beneficiary countries reached a preset economic-
development threshold.30 Despite the 1994 Uruguay Round's shift back
toward reciprocity with the establishment of the WTO,1 nonreciprocal
preferences remain entrenched in the current international trade system.
32
27. Lenaghan, supra note 17, at 118.
28. Moss, supra note 24, at 670.
29. Id.
30. Most nonreciprocal preference programs base eligibility on World Bank high-income
economy designations or U.N. least developed country (LDC) designations. See LARS NILSSON,
COMPARATIVE EFFECTS OF EU AND US TRADE POLICIES ON DEVELOPING COUNTRY EXPORTS
5-8 (2005), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/129998.htm. In most preference-
granting countries' schemes, countries that the World Bank designates as high-income
economies are generally ineligible to receive nonreciprocal preferences. The high-income
economy threshold, which is determined through gross national income per capita, is currently
set at $12,476. How We Classify Countries, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/about/
country-classifications (last visited June 7, 2012). Unlike the World Bank high-income economy
designations, U.N. LDC designations are based on a combination of economic and noneconomic
factors. In addition to having a gross national income of nine hundred dollars or less, a country
must also meet economic vulnerability and human resource weakness criteria. U.N. Office of
the High Representative for Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries
& Small Island Developing States, The Criteria for the Designation of the LDCs, UNITED
NATIONS, http://www.un.org/special-rep/ohrlls/ldcldc%20criteria.htm (last visited June 7,
2012). External benchmarks are necessary because the Enabling Clause, as well as the World
Trade Organization (WTO) framework in general, provides no objective criteria for determining
whether a country is developed, and thus ineligible for special treatment, or developing, and thus
eligible for special treatment. Instead, WTO members may self-designate, though other WTO
members may challenge a self-designated "developing" country's use of provisions available on-
ly to developing countries. Panitchpakdi, supra note 4, at 774. In practice, however, WTO
members may be reluctant to challenge other members' self-designations. See Alexander Keck &
Patrick Low, Special and Differential Treatment in the WTO: Why, When, and How?, in ECONOM-
IC DEVELOPMENT AND MULTILATERAL TRADE COOPERATION, supra note 1, at 147, 159
(mentioning that Mexico and South Korea continue to self-designate as developing countries
despite becoming members of the OECD).
31. The 1994 Uruguay Round agreements focused on integrating developing countries
into the international trade system rather than maintaining static differentiation between de-
veloped and developing countries as had been done under the GATI'. Thus, developing
countries' indefinite exemptions from certain obligations shifted for the most part to definite
exemptions that allowed for gradual rather than immediate implementation. Garcia, supra note
18, at 296-97; Mo's, supra note 18, at 3-4. LDCs, however, remain exempt from implemen-
tation time frames. Panitchpakdi, supra note 4, at 774.
32. The Enabling Clause was subsequently incorporated into the WTO agreements un-
der paragraph I (b)(iv) of the GAT[ 1994. Moss, supra note 24, at 670 n. 19.
[Vol. 33:821
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Preference-granting countries, however, still enjoy significant discretion
over their nonreciprocal preferential schemes. Although WTO members are
allowed to grant nonreciprocal preferences, they are by no means obligated to
do so.33 In addition, while the Enabling Clause provides a legal basis for non-
reciprocal preferences, it also gives preference-granting countries significant
policy space in which to implement their own programs. 34 Certain limitations
on eligibility are prohibited,35 but preference-granting countries are otherwise
given significant discretion regarding a program's conditionality, the scope of
its product coverage, and its rules for determining what goods qualify as
"originating" from the beneficiary country.3 6 Thus, as will be seen in this
Note, the nature and effectiveness of nonreciprocal preferences can differ
greatly from one preference-granting country to another.
II. U.S. NONRECIPROCAL PREFERENCE SCHEME
Many aspects of the U.S. nonreciprocal preference scheme37 reflect the
discretionary nature of nonreciprocal preferences. While eligibility for U.S.
GSP is based on economic criteria, which are measured by World Bank
high-income economy designations,38 the United States also uses additional
33. Garcia, supra note 18, at 311.
34. See Omar T. Mohammedi, International Trade and Investment in Algeria: An Over-
view, 18 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 375, 395 (2010) ("[N]o common, standardized system exists
that gives all developing countries equal conditions with respect to developed countries.").
Although the GATT contracting parties considered a mutually coordinated GSP program, lack
of agreement among developed countries led instead to individually implemented programs.
Gregory Shaffer & Yvonne Apea, Institutional Choice in the General System of Preferences
Case: Who Decides the Conditions for Trade Preferences? The Law and Politics of Rights, 39
J. WORLD TRADE 977, 980 (2005).
35. For instance, discriminatory treatment between similarly placed beneficiaries and
creation of a closed list of beneficiaries is not permitted. Moss, supra note 24, at 691-93. As
will be discussed in note 125, WTO members' ability to selectively target nonreciprocal pref-
erence program beneficiaries has become subject to increased challenge in recent years. While
WTO members have agreed to a specific special and differential treatment exception for WTO
members who are LDCs, some have questioned the legality of other targeted preference pro-
grams in light of a recent WTO panel decision, EC-Tariff Preferences. See WTO General
Council, Preferential Tariff Treatment for Least-Developed Countries: Decision on Waiver,
WT/L/304 (June 17, 1999), available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/
waiver1999_e.pdf (outlining the LDC special and differential treatment exception); Pa-
nitchpakdi, supra note 4, at 774; Lorand Bartels, The WTO Legality of the EU's GSP+
Arrangement, 10 J. INT'L ECON. L. 869, 869-70 (2007).
36. Ozden & Reinhardt, supra note 1, at 190-91.
37. The United States first established its scheme in 1974, when it authorized the presi-
dent to "provide duty-free treatment for any eligible article from any beneficiary developing
country .... " 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1974); JONES, supra note 9, at 7-8.
38. Countries that are determined to be high-income economies according to World
Bank statistics are not eligible for U.S. GSP. JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at 20; OFFICE OF
THE U.S. TRADE REP. [USTR], U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREFERENCES (GSP) GUIDE-
BOOK 13 (2011).
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eligibility requirements as a tool to promote U.S. foreign policy. 39 In addi-
tion to economic criteria, eligibility for U.S. GSP rests on a variety of
mandatory criteria, including the potential beneficiary's enforcement of U.S.
arbitral awards and its efforts to protect and develop workers' rights and
eliminate child labor.40 In addition, U.S. officials may also consider certain
enumerated discretionary criteria, such as the extent that other preference-
granting countries have extended similar preferences, whether the potential
beneficiary has opened its own markets to U.S. goods and services, and the
extent to which the beneficiary has enforced U.S. intellectual property
rights.
41
At present, 128 beneficiary countries and territories are eligible for
preferential treatment under U.S. GSP. 42 Unlike other schemes, such as EU
GSP, U.S. GSP grants duty-free treatment to all GSP-eligible products
originating from these beneficiaries. 43 U.S. GSP, however, does impose
several limitations on market access. For instance, products designated as
import-sensitive, such as certain textiles, electronic goods, steel, and glass,
are not eligible for GSP.44 In addition, U.S. GSP imposes competitive need
limitations (CNLs) on eligible products. CNLs prevent an otherwise eligible
product that originates from a beneficiary country from receiving
preferential treatment if product import values from that country exceed
either $135 million or fifty percent of total U.S. imports for that product.
45
Like other countries, the United States also grants special nonreciprocal
preferences to select subgroups of countries. 46 Beneficiaries recognized by
the United States as least developed countries (LDCs),47 for instance,
39. See Garcia, supra note 18, at 304 (noting that conditions "exist to accomplish or
protect important donor country interests").
40. Shaffer & Apea, supra note 34, at 981 n. 16.
41. JONES, supra note 9, at 9.
42. Generalized System of Preference (GSP), USTR, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topics/
trade-development/preference-programs/generalizedsystem-preference-gsp (last visited June
7,2012).
43. UNCTAD, supra note 13, at 7.
44. Amy M. Mason, Note, The Degeneralization of the Generalized System of Prefer-
ences (GSP): Questioning the Legitimacy of the U.S. GSP, 54 DUKE L.J. 513, 521-22 (2004).
While some import-sensitive products are explicitly mentioned in the statute, the GSP Sub-
committee has the authority to designate additional products as import-sensitive. 19 U.S.C.
§ 2463(a)(1)(A), (b)(1)(G) (2011); see also UNCTAD, supra note 13, at 12.
45. Press Release, USTR, Obama Administration Completes 2008 Review of Generalized
System of Preferences (June 2009), available at http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/2009/june/obama-administration-completes-2008-annual-review-gen.
46. See Ruth Kelly, U.S. and EU Non-Reciprocal Preferences: Maintaining the Acquis,
3 LAw & DEv. REv. 1, 1 (2010).
47. Similar to the U.N. LDC determinations, the United States makes its determinations
based on factors such as per capita income level, economic stability, and quality-of-life
indicators. JONES, supra note 9, at 10. As of May 2011, forty-two LDCs were eligible for U.S.
GSP-LDC. USTR, supra note 38, at 3.
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receive more favorable market access through U.S. GSP-LDC.4 8 Under U.S.
GSP-LDC, LDC beneficiaries receive preferential market access on many ad-
ditional tariff lines not available to non-LDC GSP beneficiaries.49 Moreover,
LDC beneficiaries are not subject to certain restrictions imposed on non-LDC
beneficiaries, such as CNLs50
The United States also grants special nonreciprocal preferences based
on a country's geographical location. The African Growth and Opportunity
Act (AGOA), for example, grants nonreciprocal preferences specifically to
sub-Saharan African countries.5' Initial legislation made AGOA
beneficiaries eligible for U.S. GSP preferences as well as preferences on
additional tariff lines not available to U.S. GSP beneficiaries.52 Subsequent
AGOA amendments also expanded coverage for textile and apparel
products. 53 The AGOA legislation does impose restrictions on market access
and eligibility,54 but relative to other preference programs AGOA is quite
48. See JONES, supra note 9, at 11; UNCTAD, supra note 13, at 11.
49. See JONES, supra note 9, at 11; USTR, THE U.S. GENERALIZED SYSTEM OF PREF-
ERENCES (GSP) PROGRAM: INCREASING EXPORTS FROM 131 COUNTRIES 1, http://www.
ustr.gov/sites/default/files/uploads/gsp/asset-upload-file35_15365.pdf (last visited June 7,
2012).
50. JONES, supra note 9, at 11; UNCTAD, supra note 13, at 8.
51. NILSSON, supra note 30, at 7. Passed as part of the Trade and Development Act of
2000, AGOA was envisioned as a complement to direct foreign aid programs that focused on
fostering development and combating the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Moss, supra note 24, at 676.
The program was extended by the AGOA Acceleration Act (AGOA Ill) and is currently due to
expire in September 2015. Summnary of AGOA Acceleration Act of 2004-AGOA III, Ex-
PORT.Gov, http://www.agoa.gov/agoalegislation/agoajlegislation3.html (last visited June 7,
2012). Other U.S. regional nonreciprocal programs include the Andean Trade Promotion and
Drug Eradication Act; the U.S. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act; and Title Two, Arti-
cle IV of the U.S. Compact of Free Associated States with the Marshall Islands, the Federated
States of Micronesia, and Palau. Kelly, supra note 46, at 1. For more information on U.S. re-
gional nonreciprocal programs, see generally DANIEL ANTHONY, THE TRADE P'SHIP,
UNILATERAL PREFERENTIAL TRADE PROGRAMS OFFERED BY THE UNITED STATES, THE EURO-
PEAN UNION, AND CANADA: A COMPARISON (2008), available at http://
www.tradepartnership.com/pdf files/GSPComparison.pdf.
52. Moss, supra note 24, at 677.
53. See, e.g., Summary of AGOA 11, EXPORT.Gov, http://www.agoa.gov/agoa-
legislation/agoajlegislation2.html (last visited June 7, 2012) (mentioning extension of AGOA
preferences to hybrid products cut in the United States and the beneficiary country and expan-
sion of the cap on apparel made from regional fabric and regional yarn from 3% to 7%);
AGOA Apparel Eligibility, EXPORT.GOv, http://agoa.gov/eligibility/apparel-
eligibility.html (last visited June 7, 2012) (mentioning extension of duty-free and quota-free
access for eligible AGOA apparel and textile products through 2015).
54. For instance, while AGOA gives the U.S. president discretion to expand product
coverage, his decision is subject to a prior determination of the product's import-sensitivity.
UNCTAD, supra note 13, at 37. In addition, like U.S. GSP, AGOA also imposes conditions on
eligibility. To be AGOA eligible, a sub-Saharan African country must have begun or have al-
ready implemented certain institutional reforms, such as a market-based economy with
minimal government interference, economic policies to reduce poverty and improve health
care and education, rule of law, and a system to prevent corruption and bribery. Id. at 36.
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generous.55 AGOA beneficiaries enjoy preferential access for over 1,800
additional tariff lines-including watches, electronic articles, steel articles,
footwear, handbags, luggage, flat goods, work gloves, leather wearing
apparel, and semimanufactured and manufactured glass products-not
available to non-AGOA GSP beneficiaries. 56 Moreover, AGOA beneficiaries
can qualify for preferential access for textile and apparel products that are
excluded from the U.S. GSP and U.S. GSP-LDC programs. 57 Product
coverage under AGOA, in fact, exceeds product coverage under U.S. GSP
and U.S. GSP-LDC.5 1 In addition, unlike U.S. GSP, both LDC and non-LDC
AGOA beneficiaries are exempt from CNLs.
5 9
III. EU NONRECIPROCAL PREFERENCE SCHEME
The EU scheme was originally created in 1971. 60 Its current iteration
grants nonreciprocal preferences through three programs-general GSP,
GSP-plus, and the Everything but Arms (EBA) Initiative. 6' General EU GSP,
the most widely used program, currently grants preferences to 176 benefi-
ciary countries and territories. 62 General EU GSP preferential tariff rates,
Moreover, AGOA eligibility designations are not static-failure to make continued progress
on eligibility criteria can result in termination of eligibility. Id.
55. UNCTAD, Trade Preferences for LDCs: An Early Assessment of Benefits and Pos-
sible Improvements, 9, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITCD/TSB/2003/8 (2003) (by Stefano Inama).
56. Id. at 10-11.
57. Id. To be eligible for AGOA textile and apparel preferences, beneficiaries must first
meet certain requirements. For instance, before an AGOA beneficiary can qualify for textile
and apparel preferences, it must develop an effective visa system, as well as enforcement and
verification procedures, to prevent illegal trans-shipment and counterfeit documentation.
AGOA Apparel Eligibility, supra note 53. Products must also comply with sourcing re-
strictions-such as requirements that products be made from U.S., regionally-assembled, or
LDC materials-and caps are placed on products not wholly assembled from U.S. fabric or
yarn. Id. In recognition of their limited capacity, however, lesser-developed AGOA beneficiar-
ies are subject to less stringent sourcing restrictions. id. Under the Special Rule for Apparel
Applying to Lesser Developed AGOA Countries, until September 30, 2012, exports from less-
er-developed AGOA beneficiaries made from fabric of any origin can still qualify for duty-free
and quota-free treatment, provided the product is wholly assembled in the lesser-developed
beneficiary country. However, these exports are still subject to a cap. Id.
58. UNCTAD, supra note 55, at 9. The EU program, in contrast, grants all LDCs the
same level of preferences. See CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV., WORKING GRP. ON GLOBAL TRADE
PREFERENCE REFORM, OPEN MARKETS FOR THE POOREST COUNTRIES: TRADE PREFERENCES
THAT WORK 7 (2010). While the U.S. Congress recently considered extending AGOA prefer-
ences to all LDCs, it eventually decided to leave the current AGOA framework unchanged.
See infra note 176.
59. GAO, supra note 11, at 18.
60. UNCTAD, Generalized System of Preferences, Handbook on the Scheme of the Eu-
ropean Community, at vii, U.N. Doc. UNCTADI1TCDITSB/Misc.25Rev.3 (2008).
61. Id. at vii-viii.
62. See id. at 1. For a list of products eligible for general EU GSP preferences, see
Council Regulation 732/2008, Annex II, 2008 O.J. (L 211) 1, 19-37 (EC) (as amended by
Council Regulation 512/2011,2011 O.J. (L 145) 28 (EU)).
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however, differ depending on whether a product is classified as sensitive or
nonsensitive. While nonsensitive products enter the EU duty-free, tariff re-
ductions on sensitive products vary depending on the product and the type
of duties normally applied.63 Like U.S. GSP, general EU GSP imposes cer-
tain graduation mechanisms that limit the volume of exports originating
from any one beneficiary country. For instance, utilization of general EU
GSP preferences may be reduced because of country-section graduation.
64
When a certain product section6 from a beneficiary country accounts for
more than fifteen percent--or twelve-and-a-half percent in the case of tex-
tile products'-of total EU imports for that product section over three
consecutive years, then the EU will suspend the beneficiary country's GSP
preferences for that product section.
67
While differences in the number of countries eligible for general EU GSP
vis-A-vis the number of countries eligible for U.S. GSP may seem dramatic,
two differences between U.S. GSP and general EU GSP help explain this dis-
parity. First, the general EU GSP program inclusively grants eligibility while
placing restrictions on utilization. 68 All developing countries are initially
considered eligible for general EU GSP unless and until they fail to satisfy
certain conditions specified by the program. 69 However, should an eligible
63. Ozden & Reinhardt, supra note 1, at 195. Sensitive products face two types of tar-
iffs: ad valorem duties and specific duties. Most favored nation (MFN) ad valorem duties,
which are a set percentage of the value of the product being imported, are reduced by 3.5 per-
centage points, while MFN-specific duties, a sum assessed without reference to a product's
market value, are reduced by 30%. See UNCTAD, supra note 60, at 3. Textile products are
treated differently than other sensitive products under general EU GSP: MFN-specific duties
are only reduced by 20%. Id. at 3.
64. UNCTAD, supra note 60, at 6.
65. Examples of product sections include Live Animals and Animal Products (Sec-
tion I), covering Harmonized System (HS) Chapters 1 through 5; Vegetable Products (Section
II), covering HS Chapters 6 through 14; and Textiles and Textile Articles (Section XI), which
cover HS Chapters 50 through 63. For a complete list of all twenty-one sections, see Commis-
sion Regulation 861/2010, 2010 O.J. (L 284) 1, 5-7 (EU).
66. A proposed EU reform would increase thresholds to 14.5% for textile products and
17.5% for all other eligible products by 2014. Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council Applying a Scheme of Generalised Tariff Preferences,
at 70, COM (2011) 241 final (Oct. 5, 2011) [hereinafter Commission Proposal]; see also Lars
Nilsson, The European Union's Proposal for the Next EU Generalized System of Preferences
7 (2011) (draft manuscript), available at http://204.3.197.155/ETSG201 I/Papers/Nilsson.pdf;
Isabelle Ramdoo, EU Slims Down Number of Beneficiaries Under New Trade Scheme,
TALKING POINTS (May 13, 2011, 11:59 AM), http://www.ecdpm-talkingpoints.org/eu-slims-
down-number-of-beneficiaries-under-new-trade-scheme.
67. UNCTAD, supra note 60, at 6. Preferences, however, can be reintroduced if imports
subsequently fall below threshold limits. Id. at 7. In addition, if the imports in the section ac-
count for more than 50% of the value of the beneficiary's total GSP imports to the EU,
graduation rules do not apply. Id. For more information, see Council Regulation 732/2008,
supra note 62, art. 13.
68. See ANTHONY, supra note 51, at 11.
69. Sanoussi Bilal et al., GSP Reform: Principles, Values and Coherence 9-10 (Eur. Ctr.
for Dev. Policy Mgmt., Briefing Note No. 24, 2011), available at http://www.ecdpm.org/
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country fail to satisfy any of these conditions, its benefits under the pro-
gram, but not its eligibility for the program, are temporarily suspended.7"
Second, unlike the EU scheme, the U.S. scheme excludes certain Com-
munist countries and conditions eligibility on a country's adoption of certain
political and macroeconomic policies.71 Thus, general EU GSP extends
preferences to certain countries-China, Vietnam, and Cuba-that are ex-
cluded from U.S. GSP.
72
Despite the permissive nature of general EU GSP eligibility, beneficiary
status can be completely revoked in certain circumstances. If a beneficiary is
classified as a high-income country, as determined by the World Bank,73 and
imports from its five largest sectors account for less than seventy-five per-
cent of the value of its total GSP-eligible imports, the beneficiary will
become ineligible for general GSP preferences. 74 Beneficiaries that have
signed a free trade agreement with the EU are also ineligible to receive gen-
eral EU GSP preferences, provided the free trade agreement offers at least
the same level of preference as general EU GSP.75
In 2006, the EU established its GSP-plus program, which grants en-
hanced nonreciprocal preferences for certain countries. 76 Eligibility for the
program is based on a combination of economic and noneconomic factors.
First, a country must be considered economically "vulnerable" in terms of
the size or limited diversification of its exports.7 7 Like general EU GSP, eli-
WebECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/09398052BE300D50C 12578640059F6FC/$FILE/
Bilal-Ramdoo-Roquefeuil%20BN24%2OApril%202011%20GSP%20reformfinal.pdf. In con-
trast, countries must satisfy certain conditions before they are considered eligible for U.S. GSP.
ANTHONY, supra note 51, at 12. However, the EU has recently proposed removing upper-
middle-income countries from general GSP eligibility, which would significantly reduce the
number of countries eligible for general GSP preferences. See Commission Proposal, supra note
66, at 9, 11; Nilsson, supra note 66, at 5-7; Ramdoo, supra note 66.
70. See ANTHONY, supra note 51, at 12-13.
71. JONES, supra note 9, at 8-9; ANTHONY, supra note 51, at 12-13.
72. ANTHONY, supra note 51, at 5-6; see JONES, supra note 9, at 8.
73. ANTHONY, supra note 51, at 13. See also supra note 30 (describing World Bank
classification of countries).
74. Council Regulation 732/2008, supra note 62, art. 3(1). Preferences, however, can be
reintroduced if a country does not meet the above two criteria for three consecutive years.
UNCTAD, supra note 60, at 7.
75. Council Regulation 732/2008, supra note 62, art. 3(2). A new EU-proposed GSP
reform would enlarge the scope of this provision by prohibiting general GSP preferences for
any country that has signed a preferential market arrangement with the EU, including an inter-
im economic partnership agreement (EPA), that provides at least the same level of preference
as general EU GSP. However, preferences would be phased out over a two-year period after
the preferential market arrangement enters into force. See Nilsson, supra note 66, at 6;
Ramdoo, supra note 66.
76. ANTHONY, supra note 51, at 4-5.
77. The Commission Proposal has left this program in place, though it does modify it
slightly. Commission Proposal, supra note 66, at 6, 13. For a country to meet diversification
requirements, the Proposal states that the seven largest sections of its GSP-covered imports
into the EU must represent more than 75% of its total GSP-covered imports. GSP-covered im-
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gibility is determined by the country's performance in the EU market during
a three-year period.78 Second, eligibility for GSP-plus is conditioned on rati-
fication and effective implementation of twenty-seven specified international
conventions on human rights, labor standards, sustainable development, and
good governance.
79
Although the vast majority of nonreciprocal preferential imports con-
tinue to enter the EU market under general EU GSP, the GSP-plus program
provides its beneficiaries with more extensive market access.80 While the EU
GSP-plus program provides preferential market access for roughly the same
number of tariff lines as general EU GSP, it grants duty-free treatment to
almost all sensitive and nonsensitive products.8 1 General EU GSP, in con-
trast, does not.
82
EU GSP-plus eligibility must be requested and reapplied for each time
the GSP-plus enabling regulation is renewed.83 Unfortunately, the application
process is not flexible; applications for EU GSP-plus eligibility may only be
filed during a relatively small window of time. 84 EU GSP-plus eligibility may
also be revoked if a beneficiary fails to implement the specified conventions
ports from that country must also represent less than 2% of total EU imports under GSP. Id. at
69. The Proposal, to be effective by 2014, raised this threshold from 1% to 2%. Nilsson, supra
note 66, at 7, 14.
78. Commission Proposal, supra note 66, at 69.
79. Id. at 6, 8. For a list of all twenty-seven conventions, see UNCTAD, supra note 60,
at 14; Commission Proposal, supra note 66, at 70-71. A country must also accept regular
monitoring and periodic review of its implementation of the conventions. UNCTAD, supra
note 60, at 14. While the EU is currently responsible for monitoring beneficiaries' implemen-
tation of the conventions, the Commission Proposal would shift the burden of proof to
beneficiaries by requiring them to demonstrate that they are successfully implementing the
conventions. See Commission Proposal, supra note 66, at 2, 16; Nilsson, supra note 66, at 7.
While the EU maintains that making eligibility for EU GSP-plus contingent on ratification and
implementation of conventions does not violate its WTO commitments, some have argued that
it does. See generally Bartels, supra note 35.
80. See EUR. COMM'N, FACTSHEET: EC GENERALISED SCHEME OF TARIFF PREFER-
ENCES 2009-2011 (2008), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/uly/tradoc-
139988.pdf.
81. UNCTAD, supra note 60, at 3; ANTHONY, supra note 51, at 8. However, some re-
strictions do apply. If the product is subject to both an ad valorem and a specific duty, only the
ad valorem duty is completely suspended; the specific duty will still be assessed. UNCTAD,
supra note 60, at 12-13. The program also exempts chewing gum-related products from duty-
free treatment. Id. at 13.
82. UNCTAD, supra note 60, at 3; ANTHONY, supra note 5 1, at 7-8.
83. UNCTAD, supra note 60, at 13.
84. Previously, unsuccessful candidates were required to wait until new enabling legis-
lation was passed before they could reapply. But the current enabling legislation, originally
effective through 2011 but extended until 2013, Council Regulation 512/2011, 2011 O.J. (L
145) 28, 28 (EU), provides for a midterm window for applications. EUR. COMM'N, supra note
80.
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or continues to engage in certain unfair trade practices. 85 In such cases, the
enabling regulation outlines a systemic procedure for revoking benefits.
86
The EU also offers a special nonreciprocal preference program-the
EBA Initiative-for LDCs. Eligibility for the EBA Initiative is linked only
to a country's designation by the United Nations as an LDC.87 Under the
EBA Initiative, all LDC-originating products except for arms and ammuni-
tion are given duty-free and quota-free access to EU markets.88 The EBA
Initiative covers approximately 7,200 tariff lines, including important prod-
ucts like "beef and other meat; dairy products; fruit and vegetables;
processed fruit and vegetables; maize and other cereals; starch; oils; pro-
cessed sugar products; cocoa products; pasta; and alcoholic beverages.
89
Moreover, unlike general EU GSP and GSP-plus, authority for the EBA Ini-
tiative is not limited to a certain time period, as no end date is specified in
the enabling regulation.90
Lastly, the EU has also pursued economic partnership agreements
(EPAs) with many of its former nonreciprocal preference program benefi-
ciaries.91 Beginning in 1963, EU countries provided nonreciprocal
preferences for their former colonies, known collectively as the African Car-
ibbean and Pacific (ACP) group.92 However, EU countries began to pursue
more reciprocal arrangements through negotiation of the Cotonou Agree-
ment in 2000.93 Nonreciprocal ACP-group preferences under the Cotonou
85. UNCTAD, supra note 60, at 16.
86. For a comprehensive explanation of the procedure, see id. at 17-18.
87. Id. at 12. However, the EU has retained flexibility over eligibility decisions and has
the authority to establish at least a three-year transitional period to phase out benefits for bene-
ficiaries that have graduated from LDC status. Id.
88. See Council Regulation 2501/2001, art. 9(1), 2001 O.J. (L 346) 1, 4 (EC) (incorpo-
rating Council Regulation 416/2001, 2001 O.J. (L 60) 1, 2 (EC)); ANTHONY, supra note 51, at
6-7.
89. UNCTAD, supra note 60, at 9. Three sensitive products-fresh bananas, raw sugar,
and rice-were initially exempted, pending gradual phase-in periods. Bananas were fully lib-
eralized by 2006 through progressive reductions in tariff rates, and rice and sugar were fully
liberalized by 2009 through progressive elimination of duty-free tariff quotas. See UNCTAD,
Handbook on Duty-Free Quota-Free and Rules of Origin, Part : Quad Countries, 20-21,
U.N. Doe. UNCTAD/ALDC/2008/4 (2008).
90. UNCTAD, supra note 55, at 45; Council Regulation 416/2001, supra note 88,
pmbl. (11).
91. See UNCTAD, Economic Partnership Agreements: Comparative Analysis of Agri-
cultural Provisions, at xvi, U.N. Doe. UNCTAD/DITC/TNCD/2009/3 (2010) (by Mareike
Meyn & Jane Kennan) (mentioning that thirty-six African Caribbean and Pacific [ACP] coun-
tries have signed EPAs with the EU).
92. Shaffer & Apea, supra note 34, at 982-83.
93. See Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African, Caribbean and
Pacific Group of States of the One Part, and the European Community and its Member States,
of the Other Part arts. 36, 53, June 23, 2000, 2000 O.J. (L 317) 3 [hereinafter Cotonou Agree-
ment]. The Cotonou Agreement, which was signed by seventy-nine ACP countries, provided
ACP signatories with nonreciprocal preferential EU market access on manufactured and pro-
cessed products and certain agricultural goods through 2007. NILSSON, supra note 30, at 3.
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Agreement were offered pursuant to a temporary WTO waiver.94 However,
owing to opposition from non-ACP developing countries, the EU allowed
the waiver to lapse in 2007. 95 Following the EU's decision, many non-LDC
ACP countries signed interim EPAs with the EU.96 While non-LDC ACP
countries were not required to enter into EPAs, many chose to do so as other
arrangements available to them, such as general EU GSP, would have signif-
icantly reduced their preferential access to EU markets.
97
EPAs are distinct from nonreciprocal preference programs, but they do
resemble nonreciprocal programs in some ways. Like nonreciprocal prefer-
ence programs, EPA signatories receive immediate, unilateral access to EU
markets. 98 However, in contrast to nonreciprocal preference programs, an
EPA signatory is required to gradually reduce tariffs on EU goods as well as
eliminate other barriers to trade.99 In addition, unlike nonreciprocal prefer-
ences, which are unbound grants that can be withdrawn, preferential access
under EPAs is part of a broader, legally binding international treaty by
which the EU has committed itself to providing preferential market access
for signatory country products. 1°°
IV. COMPARISON OF EU AND U.S.
NONRECIPROCAL PREFERENCE SCHEMES
Overall, juxtaposing different schemes can be difficult, as the extent to
which each scheme promotes or inhibits development and economic growth
in beneficiary countries can be case-specific.' Nonetheless, an analysis of
the U.S. and EU schemes provides several recommendations regarding the
creation of a more effective nonreciprocal preference scheme, particularly
with respect to stability of preferences, conditions on country eligibility,
product coverage, and rules of origin.
However, by signing the Cotonou Agreement, ACP signatories committed themselves to nego-
tiating reciprocal EPAs with the EU. UNCTAD, supra note 91, at 5.
94. In this case, a WTO waiver was necessary, as Cotonou Agreement preferences vio-
lated the EU's WTO commitments. See UNCTAD, supra note 91, at 5.
95. Kimberly Anne Elliot, Opening Markets for Poor Countries: Are We There Yet? 14
(Ctr. for Global Dev., Working Paper No. 184, 2009), available at http://www.cgdev.org/
content/publications/detail/1422923.
96. Id.
97. See Kelly, supra note 46, at 5; Lippoldt & Kowalski, supra note 8, at 12.
98. UNCTAD, supra note 91, at 1.
99. See id. at 1, 59, 62 (mentioning limitations on use of export duties and nontariff
barriers). In exchange for immediate duty-free and quota-free access to EU markets, develop-
ing-country parties must commit to liberalize "substantially all trade" within an established
time frame. Id. at 1. Current EPAs require signatories to liberalize between 75% and 97.5% of
tariff lines over periods of one to twenty-five years. Id.
100. UNCTAD, supra note 55, at 33.
101. See Lesage & Kerremans, supra note 16, at 74.
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A. Stability of Preference Schemes
To effectively promote long-term development and economic growth,
preferential access through a nonreciprocal preference scheme needs to be
stable and predictable. 10 2 In this regard, short-term renewal of a nonrecipro-
cal preference program can create uncertainty, as its continuity may become
contingent on domestic political consensus. 03 In countries where political
consensus over trade policy is difficult to build, such as in the United States,
this can be problematic. 10 Since 2008, the U.S. Congress has consistently
chosen to renew U.S. GSP for relatively short periods of time. 105 Moreover,
lapses in U.S. GSP are common. 6 Since 1993, U.S. GSP has lapsed on
multiple occasions, creating gaps in the program that have lasted from one
to fifteen months'0 7 Such inconsistency can create uncertainty, impose ob-
stacles to long-range capacity-building strategies, and inhibit export-focused
investment in beneficiary countries. 108
Several reforms could make nonreciprocal preference programs like
U.S. GSP more stable and predictable. First, one of the most effective ways
to ensure the stability of nonreciprocal preferences is to remove temporal
limits in their authorizing legislation, thereby disassociating them from un-
certain outcomes during renewal debates. For example, authorization for
regional nonreciprocal preferences under the U.S. Caribbean Basin Eco-
nomic Recovery Act is not time limited.109 In the EU, authorization for the
EBA Initiative is also open ended, and the EU has discussed removing tem-
poral limitations on its other nonreciprocal preference programs by 2014.110
102. See JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at 18; CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV., supra note 58, at 12.
103. See Garcia, supra note 18, at 304. See generally Bernard Hoekman, Operationaliz-
ing the Concept of Policy Space in the WTO: Beyond Special and Differential Treatment, 8 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 405, 407-08 (2005).
104. See JONES, supra note 9, at 14 ("Since its renewal in December 2006, however, the
extension of the GSP program and other trade preferences continues to be a matter of some
debate."); Garcia, supra note 18, at 302-04 (mentioning how political difficulties affect the
U.S. nonreciprocal preference scheme).
105. At the end of 2008, Congress reauthorized U.S. GSP for only one year. Pablo M.
Bentes et al., International Trade, 43 INT'L L. 335, 364 (2009). Following a subsequent
one-year renewal in 2009, the program then lapsed completely at the end of 2010 because
of a disagreement in the U.S. Senate regarding preferential treatment for sleeping bags from
Bangladesh. See ATPDEA, TAA Extensions Likely Deadlocked, Business Worries About
Fallout, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 11, 2011, at 1, 15-17.
106. See GAO, supra note 11, at 42. Subsequent renewal, however, has generally been
made retroactive to the date the program lapsed. Generalized System of Preference (GSP),
supra note 42.
107. See GAO, supra note 11, at 42.
108. Id.; see also JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at 19.
109. JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at 19; ANTHONY, supra note 51, at 5.
110. Commission Proposal, supra note 66, at 3 ("The [proposed] Regulation will no
longer be limited in duration, thus promoting a stable framework both for economic operators
and beneficiary countries."); see also Nilsson, supra note 66, at 8, 14; Everything
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As a result, nonreciprocal preferences would not be constrained to a specific
time frame, and the continued existence of each program would not depend
on subsequent enabling legislation."' However, completely separating all
nonreciprocal programs from temporal limits may not be feasible, as such
an endeavor would be difficult to accomplish politically. 12 Moreover, non-
reciprocal preferences were, from their inception, considered to be a
temporary answer to developmental disparities.113 Arguably, this perspective
has influenced how most preference-granting countries have implemented
their programs. 
14
Second, as an alternative, preference-granting countries could renew
programs for longer time periods. In the EU, for instance, general EU GSP
and GSP-plus are generally implemented in ten-year cycles, and the ena-
bling legislation for such programs is regularly renewed.'15 Some U.S.
regional nonreciprocal preference programs have also enjoyed more predict-
able mandates and longer renewal periods than U.S. GSP."6 AGOA, for
but Arms, EUR. COMM'N: TRADE, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/wider-agenda/development/
generalised-system-of-preferences/everything-but-arms/ (last updated Feb. 23, 2012).
111. See JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at 18 (mentioning that authorization for the U.S.
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act program does not depend on subsequent renewal
legislation); Everything but Arms, supra note 110.
112. See MICHAEL J. HIscox, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND POLITICAL CONFLICT: COM-
MERCE, COALITIONS, AND MOBILITY 10 (2002) (describing how politics and industry-based
special interest groups create cleavages in industrial countries' trade policy). In the United
States, for instance, recent disagreement in the U.S. Congress over important trade issues,
such as free trade agreements with South Korea and Colombia and the recently expired Trade
Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program, have influenced U.S. GSP renewal discussions. See,
e.g., TAA, ATPDEA Renewal Remains Mired in Controversy in House, Senate, supra note 9.
Unfortunately, U.S. nonreciprocal preference programs are likely to continue to be used as a
bargaining chip for other trade policy measures. See Korea FTA Passage Further Complicated
by Republican Link to TAA, FTAs, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb. 18, 2011, at 1, 16-17.
113. See JONES, supra note 9, at 2.
114. Notably, no major preference-granting country appears to have extended all of its
nonreciprocal preference programs indefinitely. See JULIA V. SEKKEL, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV.,
SUMMARY OF MAJOR TRADE PREFERENCE PROGRAMS 2, 5-6, 7, 9-11 (Apr. 2009), available at
http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Trade/Summary.ofLMajor_- TradePreferencePrograms.Final 12
09.pdf (describing authorizing legislation for nonreciprocal preferences in the United States,
the EU, Japan, Canada, Australia, and Norway). Although initial nonreciprocal benefits under
the U.S. Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act are not time limited, subsequent expansion
of the program through the U.S.-Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act has only been author-
ized through 2020. See JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at 18; Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI),
USTR, http://www.ustr.gov/trade-topies/trade-development/preference-programs/caribbean-
basin-initiative-cbi (last visited June 7, 2012). Moreover, nonreciprocal programs are often
envisioned as a precursor to binding reciprocal trade relations. The initial AGOA legislation,
for instance, identified negotiation of free trade agreements as the next logical step in trade
relations between the United States and sub-Saharan Africa. Lesage & Kerremans, supra note
16, at 80, 91.
115. See Everything but Arms, supra note 110.
116. See JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at 3, 5 (mentioning regional nonreciprocal pro-
grams for the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa); UNCTAD, supra note 55, at 8. AGOA, in
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instance, was first authorized for an initial period of eight years and was
subsequently renewed for an additional seven years by the 2004 AGOA
amendments." 7 However, longer-term renewal alone will not completely
isolate nonreciprocal programs from the uncertainty that has plagued U.S.
GSP." 8 EU and U.S. nonreciprocal programs are still renewed on an ad hoc
basis, and therefore, they remain dependent on continued political consen-
sus. 9 It could be argued that the risk of future instability is minimal, as
most programs generally enjoy broad support and are not viewed as contro-
versial. 120 However, prior to 2006, U.S. GSP also enjoyed similar support.
12 1
Moreover, practical constraints in some countries may make long-term
renewal difficult. For instance, in 1990, the United States adopted new
budget rules that instituted a "pay-as-you-go" approach.' 2  Any bill that
requires an increase in expenditures or, in the case of tariff reductions, a
decrease in U.S. government revenue must include equivalent offsetting
measures. Thus, for every year that a U.S. nonreciprocal preference program
is renewed, legislators must also approve spending cuts or tax increases to
offset losses. Reauthorization of GSP alone can require hundreds of millions
of dollars a year in cuts or tax increases. 2 3 Legislators are, justifiably, not
eager to be associated with large tax increases or budget reductions, and as a
result they may favor short-term reauthorization rather than long-term
reauthorization, which would require larger tax increases or budget cuts.
Further, even if a preference-granting country's domestic framework
does not require offsetting measures, it may still need to make costly con-
cessions in order to maintain some of its programs because of the WTO
waiver process. 24 While U.S. GSP, EU GSP, U.S. GSP-LDC, and the EBA
Initiative are permitted under WTO exceptions for special and differential
treatment for developing countries, the WTO panel decision in EC-Tariff
particular, has enjoyed relatively strong support in the U.S. Congress. See Lesage & Kerre-
mans, supra note 16, at 77 (discussing AGOA's history).
117. UNCTAD, supra note 13, at 35. In addition, AGOA's third-country fabric provision,
which grants preferences for textile and fabric products, was renewed for three years and five
years in 2004 and 2006 respectively. Summary of AGOA 1, ExPORT.Gov, http://www.agoa.gov/
agoajlegislation/agoajlegislation.html (last visited June 7, 2012).
118. See Int'l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev. [ICTSD], US, Africa Push for AGOA
Extension at Tenth Annual Forum, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., June 15, 2011, at 3-4,
available at http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/108713/ (citing anticipated difficulties dur-
ing the AGOA renewal process in the U.S. Congress).
119. See JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at 18; Everything but Arms, supra note 110.
120. See, e.g., JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at 19 (finding that most U.S. nonreciprocal
preference programs have enjoyed broad approval in the U.S. Congress and have been con-
sistently renewed).
121. JONES, supra note 9, at 14.
122. UNCTAD, supra note 13, at 29.
123. Id.
124. See Kelly, supra note 46, at 1-2.
[Vol. 33:821
GSP and Development
Preferences12 indicated that some targeted or regional nonreciprocal prefer-
ence programs were not covered under special and differential treatment and
therefore were not consistent with WTO members' obligations. 126 As a re-
suit, preference-granting countries that wish to offer certain targeted or
regional nonreciprocal programs must seek a waiver of their WTO obliga-
tions.127 Waivers, however, are temporary, and WTO consensus is required if
a waiver is to be renewed. 128 WTO members often use their ability to block
waivers as a tool to gain favorable trade concessions. 129 Thus, as WTO mem-
bers are not permitted to offer certain nonreciprocal preference programs
without a waiver, officials may rightfully question whether the benefits of
125. In 2002, India, itself a general EU GSP beneficiary, requested consultations with
the European Community regarding the legality of one of the EU's special GSP programs. In-
dia claimed that special incentives that were given to help combat drug production and
trafficking were not in compliance with the EU's WTO commitments; the only countries that
were eligible for these incentives were twelve countries recognized by the European Commu-
nity to be experiencing significant drug problems. The dispute progressed to the Panel stage,
where it was found that the European Community's special drug program violated GATr Ar-
ticle I(1), since it did not grant identical treatment for all WTO members, and was not justified
under the Enabling Clause, which requires "non-discriminatory" treatment. Appellate Body
Report, European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Devel-
oping Countries, 1[ 134-141, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004). The WTO Appellate Body,
while upholding the Panel's conclusion, clarified that granting different levels of tariff prefer-
ence within a GSP scheme does not necessarily constitute discriminatory treatment. Id. 157.
Instead, differential tariff treatment among GSP beneficiaries is permitted if the preferences
correspond to a particular "development, financial or trade need" and are offered on the basis
of an objective standard to "all beneficiaries that share that need." Id. 1$Jl 160-165. Thus, the
EU's special arrangements were not justified because they set out a closed list of beneficiaries
rather than objective criteria that, if met, would allow "similarly affected" developing coun-
tries to be included in the special arrangement. Id. 187-188. See also WTO, WTO DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT: ONE-PAGE CASE SUMMARIES 1995-SEPTEMBER 2006 91 (2007), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/resfe/bookspe/dispu -summary06_- e.pdf; WTO Secretariat, Sum-
mary: European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to
Developing Countries, WTO.oRG, http://www.wto.org/english/tratope/dispu-e/casese/
ds246_e.htm (last visited June 7, 2012).
126. See, e.g., Bartels, supra note 35, at 869.
127. Waivers are required whenever a country, absent an exception, violates its GATT
Article I obligations. See ACHILLE BASSILEKIN, POSSIBILITY OF OBTAINING A NEw ACP-EC
WAIVER AT THE WTO I (Eur. Ctr. for Dev. Policy Mgmt., Discussion Paper No. 71, 2007),
available at www.ecdpm.org/dp7l. Thus, in 2010, when the EU wished to grant Pakistan
short-term special nonreciprocal tariff preferences to help the country recover from devastat-
ing floods, it had to request a WTO waiver to provide such preferences. See Council for Trade
in Goods, EU Requests Waiver on Trade Preferences to Pakistan, WTO.oRG (Nov. 30, 2010),
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news10_e/good_30nov10_e.htm.
128. See BASSILEKIN, supra note 127, at 1-2, 7.
129. Several GSP beneficiaries, led by Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, threat-
ened to block the EU's waiver request for its Cotonou Agreement with ACP countries unless
they also received tariff concessions on canned tuna products. Id. at 2; ICTSD, EC-ACP
Cotonou Waiver Finally Granted, BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEws DIG., Nov. 15, 2001, at 6,
available at http://ictsd.org/i/news/bridgesweekly/6664/. In addition, U.S. waivers for the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act and Title Two, Article IV of the U.S. Compact of
Free Associated States programs faced stiff resistance from Paraguay. See Kelly, supra note
46, at 1.
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such a program merit the trade concessions that must be given in order to
obtain a waiver. 30 The EU, for example, decided not to seek an extension
of its Cotonou Agreement waiver, which permitted it to extend nonrecip-
rocal preferences to ACP countries, as other WTO members who were
excluded from the program requested further concessions in exchange for
their support.'
31
Even if perpetual preferences or binding long-term renewal are not
feasible options, preference-granting countries could, at a minimum, issue
nonbinding guidance concerning the duration and direction of their
nonreciprocal preference programs. The European Commission, for in-
stance, has traditionally laid out the guidelines for its general EU GSP and
GSP-plus programs for ten-year cycles.' Granted, such guidelines are
nonbinding, and most preference programs would revert to MFN tariff
rates in the absence of subsequent legislation.13 However, the guidelines
do provide a clear roadmap regarding the anticipated direction of the pro-
grams, which could help create a more predictable environment that
promotes further investment and capacity building in beneficiary coun-
tries.
34
B. Conditions on Country Eligibility
Many preference-granting countries also place conditions on benefi-
ciaries' eligibility for and continued use of nonreciprocal preferences.
35
Eligibility conditions are often used as a tool to promote foreign policy
goals, 36 and although some have criticized their use as such, 137 it would be
130. Cf BASSILEKIN, supra note 127, at 6 (mentioning difficulties securing the initial
AGOA waiver because of resistance from developing-country parties); Kelly, supra note 46, at 3
("Waivers are becoming more and more difficult to obtain and it is increasingly unlikely that new
waivers will be granted for special preferences."). While an assessment of the relative merits of
EU EPAs versus U.S. regional nonreciprocal preference programs is outside the scope of this
Note, it should be noted that some have advocated for converting nonreciprocal programs to
binding reciprocal preferences. E.g., Keck & Low, supra note 30, at 159.
131. Elliot, supra note 95, at 14; see also BAssILEIMN, supra note 127, at 5-6.
132. See Everything but Arms, supra note 110.
133. See SEKKEL, supra note 114, at 1.
134. See JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at 18 (discussing the importance of a predictable
trade environment for long-term investment, stability, and economic development in beneficiary
countries).
135. See ANTHONY, supra note 51, at 13; Marley S. Weiss, International Labor and Em-
ployment Law: From Periphery to Core, 25 A.B.A. J. LAB. & Emp. L. 487, 499 (2010).
136. GAO, supra note 11, at 2-3, 14-15. Many of the U.S. GSP and AGOA eligibility cri-
teria demonstrate an underlying desire to influence beneficiary countries' domestic policy both
for idealistic and practical reasons. U.S. investors, who possess significant political influence,
strongly desire political stability and a secure investment climate in the beneficiary country in
which they invest. In addition, many in the United States retain a strong belief that "good govem-
ance, a market-based economy and democracy" will in turn lead to more peaceful and
prosperous states. Lesage & Kerremans, supra note 16, at 87.




difficult to completely sever underlying policy concerns from eligibility
requirements. 138
While many countries condition eligibility for nonreciprocal
preferences on governance and human rights concerns, the way in which
they apply these criteria to eligibility determinations may affect the extent
to which beneficiaries utilize preferences. 139 First, some countries define
their policy objectives ambiguously, while others do so by referencing
defined standards such as international treaties. Certain ambiguous
eligibility criteria in U.S. GSP and AGOA provide an example of the first
group. Beneficiaries that "engage in activities that undermine United
States national security or foreign policy interests"'14 or do not provide
"adequate and effective protection of intellectual property rights" 141 risk
having their benefits suspended. 142  Moreover, U.S. nonreciprocal
preference programs often lack a discrete mechanism for determining
whether eligibility requirements have been met. As a result, administration
of eligibility provisions may sometimes seem unpredictable and
inconsistent. 143 Cameroon and Chad, for instance, continue to be AGOA-
eligible despite reports of stifled democratic processes and systematic human
rights abuses by their governments. 144 Rwanda, Nigeria, and Uganda also
remain eligible for AGOA despite frequent "minor" political infringements.
145
On the other hand, U.S. officials decided not to grant AGOA beneficiary
138. See Monica Patel, Note, Expanding the Role of Trade Preference Programs, 95
MINN. L. REv. 1490, 1498 (2011) ("All countries model their trade preference programs on
either positive or negative conditionality... "). Moreover, elimination of some eligibility cri-
teria could undermine attempts to promote international human rights. See, e.g., Lucy Heenan
Ewins, Note, "Gross Violation": Why Uganda's Anti-Homosexuality Act Threatens Its Trade
Benefits with the United States, 34 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 147, 147 (2011) (arguing that
AGOA eligibility criteria could be used to help protect human rights in Uganda). However, as
an alternative, some have suggested that eligibility criteria should be based on positive condi-
tionality rather than negative conditionality. See JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at 21. Most U.S.
programs are based on negative conditionality, in which countries that do not meet criteria are
ineligible for benefits. Lorand Bartels, The Appellate Body Report in European Communi-
ties-Conditions for the Granting of Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries,
WT/DS246/AB/R and Its Implications for Conditionality in GSP Programmes, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 463, 466-67 (Thomas Cottier et al. eds., 2006). In con-
trast, EU GSP-plus is based on positive conditionality, which gives beneficiaries that meet
eligibility criteria enhanced benefits and market access. Id. at 465-66.
139. See supra note 138.
140. 19 U.S.C. § 3703(a)(2) (2000).
141. Id. § 2462(c)(5).
142. E.g., id. § 2462(d)(1) (permitting benefits to be suspended, withdrawn, or limited if
a country fails to abide by eligibility criteria).
143. See JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at 21 (mentioning complaints that application of
some eligibility criteria is "arbitrary and unpredictable"); JONES, supra note 9, at 22 (mention-
ing inconsistent application of intellectual property eligibility criteria).
144. David Fuhr & Zachary Klughaupt, The IMF and AGOA: A Comparative Analysis of
Conditionality, 14 DUKE J. COUP. & INT'L L. 125, 143-44 (2004).
145. Lesage & Kerremans, supra note 16, at 86.
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status to Burkina Faso in 2003 despite widespread acknowledgment by
nongovernmental organizations, international institutions, and even the U.S.
government of Burkina Faso's good governance, democratic and market
reforms, and assistance in fighting terrorism. 14 6 More recently, Congolese
officials claimed that one-sided information from Western nongovernmental
organizations regarding the human rights environment in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo resulted in the country's suspension from AGOA.
147
While the EU also incorporates good governance and human rights
concerns into most of its nonreciprocal preference program eligibility cri-
teria, it generally bases eligibility for its programs on more defined
standards than those used in the U.S. programs. Activities that lead to
temporary withdrawal of eligibility under the EU scheme include:
the serious and systematic violation of principles laid down in the
[listed] conventions [on human and labor rights], on the basis of
the conclusions of the relevant monitoring bodies;
the export of goods made by prison labour; [and]
serious shortcomings in customs controls on the export or transit
of drugs (illicit substances or precursors), or failure to comply
with international conventions on money-laundering. 48
Second, some countries provide cooperative mechanisms for discuss-
ing and correcting deficiencies before benefits are suspended. EU
programs, for instance, often provide for a defined procedure, which in-
cludes consultation and other collaborative measures, before preferences
under the program are suspended. 49 Sri Lanka, for example, recently had
its GSP-plus eligibility suspended only after it declined to engage with the
EU or respond to the EU's findings by the deadline set. 5° In contrast, U.S.
programs do not provide for a formal cooperative process for resolving
concerns or a gradual procedure for withdrawing eligibility.' 51 Instead,
continued eligibility for AGOA and U.S. GSP is determined by an annual
review and is at the discretion of U.S. officials.'52 Moreover, beneficiaries
146. Fuhr & Kiughaupt, supra note 144, at 142.
147. DRC's Suspension from AGOA Is No Sanction, AGOA.INFo (Jan. 9, 2011),
http://www.agoa.info/?view=.&story=news&subtext=1368.
148. Council Regulation 732/2008, supra note 62, art. 15(1)(a)-(c). The Commission
Proposal would also require beneficiaries to comply with international conventions on antiter-
rorism. Nilsson, supra note 66, at 7.
149. See UNCTAD, supra note 60, at 22-24 (describing use of a multistep consultation
process prior to suspension of preferences).
150. See Jarnila Najmuddin, Lanka Loses GSP Plus, DAILY MIRROR (Sri Lanka) (July 5,
2010), http://www.dailymirror.lk/index.php/news/4845-eu-regrets-lankas-silence.html.
151. See GAO, supra note 11, at 53-54.
152. See id. at 53. Some observers continue to support the annual review process, having
found that it has led to improved compliance with eligibility criteria. Id.; JONES, supra note 9,
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who fail to meet eligibility requirements can be removed from the pro-
gram shortly after notification of the decision.'53
It may be difficult to excise preference-granting countries' foreign
policy interests from nonreciprocal preference program eligibility provi-
sions. However, use of eligibility provisions that are based on objective
standards, cooperative mechanisms for resolving eligibility issues, and a
defined consultation period prior to suspension 54 could provide a feasible
compromise. Such provisions could improve the effectiveness of nonrecip-
rocal preference programs while providing a useful opportunity for




Limitations on product coverage and caps on preferential treatment
can also constrain a beneficiary's ability to utilize nonreciprocal
preferences. Most nonreciprocal preference-granting countries completely
exclude or provide only limited preferences for sensitive imports like
agricultural products, textiles, and certain manufactured goods.'5 6 While
regional and special incentive programs often offer more extensive product
coverage or better preferential margins than general GSP programs,'57 at
at 22 ("U.S. officials favor working with beneficiary countries during country practice reviews
to actively address compliance issues before removing a country from eligibility.").
153. See 19 U.S.C. § 2462(f)(2) (2006) (stating that GSP administrators must notify
Congress and the beneficiary country only 60 days before the decision to rescind benefits is
enforced).
154. As an example, some have proposed that beneficiaries be guaranteed preferences
for a defined period, during which time benefits may only be revoked in "extreme circum-
stances." Lorand Bartels & Christian Haberli, Binding Tariff Preferences for Developing
Countries Under Article II GATT, 13 J. INT'L ECON. L. 969, 987-90 (2010); William R.
Cline, Trading Up: Strengthening AGOA's Development Potential, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV.
BRIEF, June 2003, at 3.
155. See supra note 152 (discussing how consultations with beneficiary country officials
can improve beneficiary countries' compliance with eligibility criteria).
156. See ANTHONY, supra note 51, at 6-7. For example, although most manufactured
and semimanufactured products and some agricultural, fishery, and primary industrial prod-
ucts are eligible for duty-free treatment under U.S. GSP, "import-sensitive" products like
leather goods and footwear do not receive preferential treatment. UNCTAD, supra note 13, at 12.
General EU GSP also designates many products as sensitive. Sensitive products still receive pref-
erential treatment under general EU GSP but to a lesser degree than nonsensitive products.
LAURA PAEZ ET AL., AFRICAN TRADE POLICY CTR., A DECADE (2000-2010) OF AFRICAN-U.S.
TRADE UNDER THE AFRICAN GROWTH AND OPPORTUNITIES ACT (AGOA): CHALLENGES,
OPPORTUNITIES AND A FRAMEWORK FOR POST AGOA ENGAGEMENT t 1 (2010).
157. AGOA, for instance, grants preferential treatment on certain products that are not
eligible for preferences under U.S. GSP. Raj Bhala, Generosity and America's Trade Relations
with Sub-Saharan Africa, 18 PACE INT'L L. REV. 133, 176 (2006). Unlike general EU GSP, the
EU GSP-plus program provides duty-free treatment for most sensitive and nonsensitive prod-
ucts. ANTHONY, supra note 51, at 8.
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least some still exclude certain products that are produced in beneficiary
countries.158
In addition, some nonreciprocal preference programs place limits on
covered agricultural imports through restrictions on the volume of imports
that can receive preferences.159 The United States, for instance, applies a
two-tier tariff system called a tariff-rate quota (TRQ) to certain AGOA
agricultural imports. 60 TRQs apply a lower tariff to a certain in-quota
quantity of exports161 and a higher tariff to additional imports over this
quantity. 162 AGOA offers duty-free access only for in-quota quantities of
certain agricultural products like peanuts, beef, dairy, and tobacco. 63 U.S.
TRQs are generally allocated according to historic market-share data for a
given product, with any remaining amount allocated on a "first-come/first-
served" basis. 164 As many TRQs are calculated based on relatively old data,
they can pose a major impediment to beneficiary countries' utilization of
preferences. 65  Moreover, making nonreciprocal preference programs
subject to restrictions like TRQs can constrain rather than promote many
developing countries' efforts to diversify their economies through value-
added processing. 166
158. Lippoldt & Kowalski, supra note 8, at 11. For instance, over two hundred tariff
lines, roughly 17% of dutiable agricultural lines, are ineligible for preferential treatment under
AGOA. GAO, supra note 11, at 37-38; PAEZ ET AL., supra note 156, at 13. Most sugar and
cotton imports, two important exports for many beneficiary countries, are among those prod-
ucts excluded. See DAVID SKULLY, INT'L FOOD & AGRIC. TRADE POLICY COUNCIL, IPC
POLICY FoCus: U.S. TARIFF RATE QUOTAS AND AGOA MARKET ACCESS 2 (July 2010), avail-
able at http://www.agritrade.org/Publications/AGOATRQs.html.
159. See, e.g., JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at 3.
160. See SEKKEL, supra note 114, at 4.
161. WTO members have committed to provide in-quota access for WTO-member-
country products. For each product, WTO members must provide in-quota allocations
equivalent to at least 5% of domestic consumption. See SKULLY, supra note 158, at 2.
162. Id. at 2-3. Over-quota tariff rates can be very high. Peanuts face a 164% over-quota
rate while tobacco faces a 350% over-quota rate. Id. at 3-4.
163. Id. at 3-7.
164. INT'L FOOD & AGRIC. TRADE POLICY COUNCIL, AGOA AND AGRICULTURE 2
(Aug. 2009), available at http://www.agritrade.org/Publications/documents/PCHPA1PC-
JointPolicyBriefAug3.pdf.
165. See SKULLY, supra note 158, at 2. Some in-quota fill rate allocations-including
cotton and beef-are not generally filled and thus do not appear to pose a significant problem
for AGOA beneficiaries, provided global production remains static. Id. at 5-6. However, other
in-quota allocations, such as that for peanuts, can significantly constrain beneficiaries' ability
to utilize preferences. See id. at 3. Argentina is currently allocated over 80% of the in-quota
allocation for peanuts; since 2003, it has filled below 40% of its allocation. Id. AGOA peanut
imports fall into the remaining in-quota allocation, which is granted on a "first-come, first
served" basis and is generally quickly filled. See id. Thus, despite the fact that peanuts are a
major agricultural product for many AGOA beneficiaries and receive duty-free access under
AGOA, as of 2010 the United States had not imported peanuts or peanut products from any
AGOA beneficiary since 2002. Id. at 3-4.
166. U.S. escalating tariffs on cocoa products help illustrate this problem. Cocoa beans,
paste, and cocoa powder are granted duty-free access under U.S. GSP and AGOA. Id. at 7.
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In response to the above concerns, preference-granting countries could
increase the effectiveness of their preference programs by removing caps on
preferential treatment and reducing or eliminating tariffs on agricultural
products. 67 While liberalization of certain agricultural products could nega-
tively affect some domestic producers, 68 studies have shown that reducing
or completely eliminating tariffs and caps on many agricultural products
may not significantly affect domestic production. 69 In fact, the EU has al-
ready removed quantitative limitations and tariff protections on agricultural
and processed-food imports from LDCs and does not appear to have experi-
enced negative repercussions as a result. 170 Moreover, further liberalization
could generate significant savings for industries and consumers in prefer-
ence-granting countries.' 7 '
However, eliminating tariffs and caps on agricultural products in all
nonreciprocal preference programs may be a difficult goal to achieve. Pro-
tectionist agricultural trade policies are often supported by powerful
political lobbies and any potential reform can be difficult to implement.
72
However, products that contain butter fat or products that are composed of 10% or more of
sugar, characteristics common to most processed cocoa products, are subject to tariff-rate quo-
tas. Id. These products do have a theoretical in-quota tariff rate, but beneficiaries are usually
allocated a very small or nonexistent in-quota allocation. See id. at 8. For instance, although
AGOA grants in-quota duty-free access for the tariff lines comprising low-fat chocolate
crumb, no AGOA-eligible country has been assigned an in-quota allocation. Id. Thus, in reali-
ty most processed cocoa products from AGOA beneficiaries face over-quota tariff rates. As a
result, exports of raw cocoa and cocoa by-products under AGOA accounted for an average of
ninety-one million dollars during recent years, but the total value of AGOA imports for choco-
late and other processed products averaged only seventeen thousand dollars during the same
time period. Id. at 7.
167. See supra note 158 (describing how restrictions on preferential access for agricul-
tural products can limit beneficiary-country exports).
168. See JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at 17 (describing how preferential access for as-
paragus and certain cut flowers has negatively affected U.S. producers of such products).
169. GAO, supra note 11, at 1, 10.
170. See Kimberly Anne Elliot, Reviving AGOA, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV. BRIEF, Sept.
2010, at 3. The EU does retain limitations on certain agricultural products imported under its
general GSP program, but the limitations appear to be much easier to satisfy. For instance, to
qualify for preferential treatment, processed cocoa products and other processed food products
must contain 40% or less sugar by weight and 60% or less of sugar, dairy, eggs, and honey
combined. Commission Regulation 1063/2010, Annex I, pt. II, 2010 O.J. (L 307) 1, 36 (EU).
Most processed chocolate products satisfy this requirement. See Directive 2000/36/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 23 June 2000 Relating to Cocoa and Chocolate
Products Intended for Human Consumption, 2000 O.J. (L 197) 19, 19-20.
171. See JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at 18 (noting that trade liberalization generally re-
sults in cheaper imported products).
172. See Sungjoon Cho, The Demise of Development in the Doha Round Negotiations,
45 TEx. INT'L L.J. 573, 584-86,600 (2010). For instance, groups such as the American Sugar
Alliance have opposed further liberalization on economic, safety, and quality grounds. See
The Economic Effects of Significant U.S. Import Restraints: Sixth Update 2009, USITC Pub.
4094, Inv. No. 332-325, at 139-40 (Aug. 2009), available at http://www.usitc.gov/
publications/332/pub4094.pdf; Hillary E. Maki, Note, Trade Protection vs. Trade Promotion:
Are Free Trade Agreements Good for American Workers?, 20 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS &
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Therefore, as a second option, preference-granting countries could focus on
eliminating caps and tariffs on agricultural products imported from certain
subgroups of countries, such as LDCs. 173 The EU has already enacted such a
program through its EBA Initiative, 74 and other countries have expressed a
commitment to provide LDCs with similar access. 175 Some in the United
States have considered enacting similar reforms, 176 but the structure of the
U.S. political system could make such reforms difficult to implement. The
institutional framework of the EU ratification process allows politicians to
somewhat transcend local interests; final ratification of EU agreements in
national parliaments appears, at least at times, to be more of a formality. 177
Members of the U.S. Congress, on the other hand, must answer to smaller,
more active constituencies and are thus more likely to be sensitive to con-
stituents' specialized interests.
78
PUB. POL'Y 883, 891 (2006). Some have argued that protective tariffs and caps are contrary to
domestic interests and international development efforts as they artificially increase sugar
prices in the United States and undermine global prices. Maki, supra, at 891; Letter from
Women's Edge Coal. et al. to the Office of the U.S. Trade Rep., Duty-Free Quota-Free Access
for Least Developed Countries 8 (Mar. 15, 2007), available at http://www.cgdev.org/
doc/commentary/MarketAccess.pdf. One study commissioned by the Sweetener Users Asso-
ciation found that 7,500 to 10,000 jobs in sugar-using industries have been lost since 1997 as a
result of artificially high sugar prices. Others have estimated that U.S. consumers would save
about $1.6 billion per year if trade barriers on sugar products were unilaterally removed.
Maki, supra, at 892-93.
173. See JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at 20-22 (describing various ways to accommo-
date LDCs). As LDCs may be specifically targeted for special and differential treatment, such
programs would be consistent with WTO members' commitments. See supra note 35.
174. See discussion supra Part Il.
175. See JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at 22 (discussing commitments by developed-
country WTO members to extend duty-free and quota-free treatment to all LDC imports).
WTO members initially made commitments to provide duty-free and quota-free access for
LDCs during the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial Conference. However, while WTO members
discussed the possibility of turning their commitments into binding preferences during the
Doha Round in 2011, they were unable to reach a consensus regarding the final "LDC-plus"
proposal at that time. ICTSD, "Doha Light" Takes Shape as WTO Members Lower Ambitions,
BRIDGES WKLY. TRADE NEWS DIG., June 1, 2011, at 1-2, available at http://ictsd.org/i/trade-
and-sustainable-development-agenda/107871/; Trade Negotiations Comm., Members to Think
About 'What Next for Doha, WTO' for December Meeting, WTO.ORG (July 26, 2011),
http://www.wto.org/english/newse/news 1 le/tnc-infstat_26jul I l.e.htm.
176. See New Partnership for Trade Development Act of 2009, H.R. 4101, 111 th Cong.
(2009). This bill, introduced in 2009 by one of the architects of AGOA, would have created
immediate duty-free and quota-free access for all nonapparel products from LDC countries
and immediate duty-free and quota-free access for certain apparel products, subject to a 50%
cap for competitive Asian LDCs like Bangladesh and Cambodia. JONES ET AL., supra note 11,
at 21; AGOA V? H.R. 4101, AGOA.INFO, http://www.agoa.info/index.php?
view=about&story=agoaV (last visited June 7, 2012).
177. Lesage & Kerremans, supra note 16, at 92.
178. Id. During the Doha Round negotiations in 2011, domestic specialized interests ar-
guably influenced the U.S. delegation's decision to resist cotton liberalization provisions in
the LDC-plus proposal. See ICTSD, supra note 175, at 2; Vlad Spanu, Liberalization of the
International Trade and Economic Growth: Implications for Both Developed and Developing
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Therefore, as an alternative, preference-granting countries could pro-
vide tariff reductions (rather than duty-free access) to beneficiary
countries. 179 Unlike caps, which can deter long-range investment by making it
difficult for individual exporters and investors to determine applicable prefer-
ential margins in advance, 8° tariff reductions create a more predictable
environment for investment while also providing a way to shield competing
producers in the preference-granting country.'
8
1
While tariff reductions would be preferable, TRQ reforms could also
increase utilization of preferences. TRQs could be increased for beneficiary
countries or reallocated to their benefit.'82 U.S. in-quota allocations for sugar
imports, for instance, are already regularly redistributed on a temporary
basis when fill rates remain low. 183 But such reforms may have a limited
effect, as permanent reallocation of TRQs would require the consent and
appropriate compensation of current allocation holders, which could be
difficult to obtain."8 On the other hand, creation of additional in-quota
allocations for beneficiary countries would be relatively simple and would
not be contingent on the consent of other countries. 85 Alternatively,
preference-granting countries could provide beneficiaries with increased
margins of preference on in-quota and over-quota imports.
86
TRQs and tariff reductions, however, possess a significant potential
weakness: they may be more susceptible to preference erosion. Preference
erosion, which refers to the diminishing preference margins that result when
tariff levels are reduced in multilateral or bilateral trade agreements with
third-party countries, can eliminate the competitive advantage that
beneficiary countries of nonreciprocal preference programs would otherwise
enjoy. 87 Regardless, if it is possible to create tariff reductions or modified
Countries 19 (May 2003) (unpublished academic paper) (on file with the Harvard University
Center for International Development), available at http://www.cid.harvard.edu/cidtrade/
Papers/Spanu.pdf.
179. See JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at 20.
180. See supra notes 165-166 (discussing difficulties that result from volume-based re-
strictions).
181. See JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at 20 (mentioning limited tariff reductions as a
way to protect import-sensitive products).
182. See ALAN MATTHEWS & CATHIE LAROCHE-DUPRAZ, AGRICULTURAL TARIFF RATE
QUOTAS AS A DEVELOPMENT INSTRUMENT 4 (2002), available at http://www.tcd.ie/
Economics/TEP/2001_.papers/TEPNol7AM2 I.pdf; Elliot, supra note 170, at 4.
183. SKULLY, supra note 158, at 10.
184. See id. at 9.
185. In fact, additional in-quota allocations are regularly created through free trade
agreements and are consistent with countries' WTO commitments. See id. at 9-10. Some have
questioned, however, whether permanent allocations of increased quotas or in-quota tariffs
would necessarily be covered under the Enabling Clause if they were offered outside of a non-
reciprocal preference program. E.g., MATTHEWS & LAROCHE-DUPRAZ, supra note 182, at 20.
186. See SKULLY, supra note 158, at 9. Such arrangements are also used in free trade
agreements. Id.
187. JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at 14-15.
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TRQs that provide a competitive advantage over nonbeneficiary-country
products, both still represent a feasible reform strategy.
Lastly, as a compromise, it may be possible to create a program that in-
corporates sourcing requirements for processed agricultural products that
are similar to those currently used for AGOA apparel and textile products.
181
In other words, the nonreciprocal preference program would provide
duty-free treatment for both in-quota and over-quota processed agricultural
imports, provided they incorporate a certain minimum percentage of prima-
ry agricultural products from the preference-granting country. Such an
arrangement would, of course, decrease the value of preferential market ac-
cess, as production costs for the products would significantly increase.
189
However, given that tariff rates on certain processed agricultural products
can be very high, 190 it may be possible to prevent increased production costs
from erasing the competitive advantage that duty-free access would provide.
As the above reforms would likely result in lost tariff revenue, they
could be offset by reducing preferential access for certain imports that pro-
vide little value for the preference-granting country or beneficiaries. Both
the EU and United States allow certain oil products to enter duty-free under
nonreciprocal preference programs. 9' Commentators and U.S. officials, in
fact, have criticized the extent to which oil imports can dominate nonrecip-
rocal preference programs. 1
92
It is unlikely that eliminating preferential treatment for oil products
would have a significant impact on the economies of oil-producing
beneficiary countries. 193 Moreover, it would probably not significantly affect
188. As previously mentioned, apparel and textile imports must generally incorporate
U.S.-manufactured materials in order to be eligible for AGOA preferences. See supra note 57.
189. See Gumisai Mutume, Mounting Opposition to Northern Farm Subsidies: African
Cotton Farmers Battling to Survive, AFRICA RECOVERY, May 2003, at 18, available at
http://www.un.org/ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/voll7nol/171agri4.htm (implying that developed
countries have significantly higher agricultural-product production costs than developing
countries).
190. In the United States, peanut butter and paste alone face a 131.8% over-quota tariff
rate. DAVID SKULLY, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. TARIFF-RATE QUO-
TAS FOR PEANUTS 50 (1999), available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/WTOIPDFI
Skully.pdf.
191. See JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at 4-5, 14, 29 (mentioning U.S. GSP, AGOA, and
the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act); Nowakowska, supra note 14, at 117-
18, 129-30 (mentioning EU GSP).
192. See JONES ET AL., supra note 11, at 14; Alan Beattie, U.S. Plan Fails to End Africa's
Trade Isolation, FIN. TIMES (UK) (Aug. 8, 2010), http://www.ft.comlintl/cms/s/0/0fbe7cec-a321-
I ldf-8cf4-00l44feabdc0.html. In 2005 alone, AGOA beneficiary countries imported 513
million barrels of oil to the United States under AGOA. LANGTON, supra note 16, at 15. In
2006, oil products accounted for around 94% of imports under AGOA and nearly 60% of im-
ports under all U.S. preference programs. GAO, supra note 11, at 25-26.
193. As oil-production industries in beneficiary countries are already heavily capitalized
and able to compete with their counterparts in high-income countries, they are unlikely to
need preferential assistance. Moreover, relatively few nonreciprocal-program beneficiaries ex-
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domestic consumers in preference-granting countries or producers in
beneficiary countries. In industrialized countries like the United States, for
example, MIFN tariff rates on most oil products are relatively low.' 94 Thus,
oil imports from beneficiary countries could still be competitive absent
preferential treatment under nonreciprocal preference programs.
195
D. Rules of Origin
Rules of origin, which define the conditions a product must satisfy to be
considered as originating in a beneficiary country, 196 can also impact market
access.197 Rules of origin are, at their root, an attempt to balance between
promoting integrated production, preventing dilution of preferences, and
providing sufficient flexibility for countries with limited capacity to utilize
preferences.' 9 Generally, as rules of origin become less flexible or impose
stricter requirements, exporters lose the ability to choose the most cost-
effective materials and processing facilities. 199 This, in turn, results in higher
production costs, which lower the competitiveness of the product in its in-
tended market.2°° In fact, when the costs of complying with rules of origin are
greater than the preferential margins granted under the program, preferential
access will be of no practical value.201 Thus, overly rigid rules of origin can
often result in low utilization rates.
202
port oil products. Even in these countries, the sector does not create "extensive employment
opportunities." LANGTON, supra note 16, at 25.
194. Rolf Schwarz, Introduction: Resistance to Globalization in the Arab Middle East,
15 REV. INT'L POL. ECON. 590, 595 (2008); see Eckart Naumann, AGOA at 10: Reflections on
US-Africa Trade with a Focus on SACU Countries 15 (Trade L. Ctr. for S. Africa, Working
Paper No. 05/2010, 2010), available at http://www.agoa.info/download.php?file=108.
195. Id.
196. Paul Brenton & Miriam Manchin, Making EU Trade Agreements Work: The Role of
Rules of Origin 2 (Ctr. for Eur. Policy Stud., Working Doc. No. 183, 2002).
197. Id. at 1, 3; see also Jeremy T. Harris, Rules of Origin for Development: From GSP
to Global Free Trade 2 (Inter-Am. Dev. Bank, Working Paper No. 135, 2009), available at
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=1801797; Kala Krishna, Under-
standing Rules of Origin 21 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11150,
2005), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w 11150.
198. See Elliot, supra note 95, at 10; Harris, supra note 197, at 2. In fact, more flexible
rules can have a significant impact on exports. In 2003, for instance, Canada lowered local
value-added thresholds for LDCs and also allowed LDCs to cumulate inputs from both LDC
and non-LDC developing countries. In response, LDC shares of nonoil imports nearly tripled
over the span of a few years. Elliot, supra note 95, at 12.
199. ECKART NAUMANN, RULES OF ORIGIN IN EU-ACP ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP
AGREEMENTS 3 (ICTSD EPAs & Regionalism Series, Issue Paper No. 7, 2010),
available at http://ictsd.org/downloads/2011/1 2/rules-of-origin-in-eu-acp-economic-
partnership-agreements.pdf; Krishna, supra note 197, at 10.
200. NAUMANN, supra note 199.
201. See Brenton & Hoppe, supra note 15, at 11-12.
202. Id.; see also Brenton & Manchin, supra note 196, at 3 (attributing low utilization of
EU nonreciprocal preferences to the scheme's rules of origin); Peter Gibbon, Rules of Origin
and the European Union's Preferential Trade Agreements, with Special Reference to the
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Although a variety of methods for determining rules of origin exist,
20 3
nonreciprocal preference programs often specify a limited number of meth-
ods that beneficiaries may use to satisfy origin determinations. 2° Rules of
origin for U.S. nonreciprocal preference programs, for instance, require that
imports meet a thirty-five percent value-added threshold.2 5 Under the EU
nonreciprocal preference programs, rules of origin are generally calculated
based on local-content thresholds.20 6 For most products, local-content
thresholds are set at thirty percent, though some industrial products are sub-
ject to a fifty percent threshold.0 7 Most industrial products from LDCs,
however, need only meet a thirty percent threshold instead of the heightened
fifty percent threshold. 208 In addition, for both LDCs and non-LDCs, the EU
scheme allows rules of origin for many industrial products to be met in one
EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements 29 (Danish Inst. for Int'l Stud., Working
Paper No. 2008/15, 2008).
203. Most programs use one or several of four criteria: (1) domestic-content require-
ments, which are generally measured according to a minimum value added or local content
percentage; (2) change in tariff heading requirements; (3) requirements that a specific process
must be performed, such as U.S. triple-transformation requirements for AGOA textiles; and
(4) substantial-transformation requirements, which at least some countries determine on a
case-by-case basis. Krishna, supra note 197, at 8-9.
204. See ANTHONY, supra note 51, at 10 (listing the United States, the EU, and Canada's
nonreciprocal rules of origin); SEKKEL, supra note 114, at 4-14 (describing the United States, the
EU, Canada, Japan, Australia, Norway, New Zealand, and Switzerland's nonreciprocal rules of
origin).
205. A 35% value-added threshold means that the total cost or value of locally produced
materials and local processing must equal at least 35% of the value of the finished product.
UNCTAD, supra note 13, at 14. Nonlocal materials can be counted toward the before-
mentioned value-added requirement only if they are "substantially transformed." Id. The 35%
value-added threshold appears to be preferred by the United States, as witnessed by its inclu-
sion in reciprocal and nonreciprocal trade arrangements to which the United States is a party.
See ANTONI ESTEVADEORDAL & KATI SUOMINEN, RULES OF ORIGIN: A WORLD MAP AND
TRADE EFFECTS 14 (May 2004) (paper presented at the Seventh Annual Conference on Global
Economic Analysis (June 17-19, 2004)), available at http://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/
resources/download/1 866.pdf (listing 35% thresholds for several U.S. free trade agreements).
206. Local-content thresholds, like other value-added thresholds, require that a certain
minimum percentage of originating materials be used in the working or processing of final
products. See Commission Regulation 1063/2010, supra note 170, Annex I, n.1.2(a), 2010
O.J. (L 307) at 29.
207. See id. Annex I, pt. II, 2010 O.J. (L 307) at 34-70. The EU appears to favor the 30-
50% percent local-content requirement, as witnessed by its inclusion in other trade arrange-
ments to which the EU is a party. See ESTEVADEORDAL & SUOMINEN, supra note 205, at 14
(listing 30-50% local-content requirements for EU free trade agreements with South Africa,
Mexico, and Chile).
208. Examples of exempt LDC products include certain chemicals, fertilizers, plastics,
and ceramic products. See Commission Regulation 1063/2010, supra note 170, Annex 1, n.2.5,
2010 O.J. (L 307) at 29; id. Annex t, pt. II, 2010 O.J. (L 307) at 34-70. However, some LDC
products like petroleum products and certain types of glassware remain subject to the 50% lo-
cal-content requirement. Id. Annex I, pt. II, 2010 O. (L 307) at 34-70.
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of two ways-through a local-content threshold as described above 2°9 or
through a change in tariff classification.
210
To maintain flexibility and reduce compliance costs, many preference
programs also permit cumulation, which allows exporters to include in lo-
cal-content or value-added calculations components or materials sourced
from certain countries or regional trade associations.2 1 1 U.S. GSP, for exam-
ple, allows beneficiaries that belong to a common regional trade association
recognized by U.S. GSP to regionally cumulate components.2 1 2 AGOA cu-
mulation is even more flexible and allows for both bilateral cumulation
21
1
and extended cumulation among AGOA beneficiaries. 21 4 EU rules of origin
also permit bilateral 215 and regional cumulation among recognized trade
associations. 216 However, the EU rules do carve out some exceptions.
209. See M. ISABEL GARCfA CATALAN, EUR. COMM'N, THE EU REFORM OF THE RULES
OF ORIGIN (Mar. 17, 2009), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/html/143004.htm.
210. To meet the EU change in tariff classification requirement, a final product and its
original components must be classified in a different four-digit Harmonized System heading
or six-digit Harmonized System subheading. Id. Annex I, n.1.2(b), 2010 O.J. (L 307) at 29.
Thus, using woven cotton fabric (HS 5208) to produce cotton shirts (HS 6105) would result in
a change in tariff classification on the four-digit level. Brenton & Manchin, supra note 196, at
12. As six-digit tariff groups represent subcategories within the four-digit headings, a change
on the 6-digit level would require a similar, though less extensive, transformation. See Fre-
quently Asked Questions-Tariff Affairs, USITC, http://www.usitc.gov/faqs/tariffaffairs
faqs.htm (last visited June 7, 2012).
211. Cumulation is based on the assumption that regional materials are inexpensive and
relatively available. But if this assumption is not correct, products may require significant
preferential margins to be competitive in the preference-granting market, and producers will
need to develop separate supply chains to be competitive in other markets. In fact, the EU's
decision to expand cumulation provisions while only slightly relaxing local-content thresholds
and tolerance levels was criticized in this regard. Gibbon, supra note 202, at 20.
212. U.S. GSP currently recognizes five regional cumulation groups: the Andean Group,
the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) excluding Singapore and Brunei Da-
russalam, the Caribbean Common Market, the Southern Africa Development Community, and
the West African Economic and Monetary Union. UNCTAD, supra note 13, at 14-15.
213. Components produced in the United States can count for up to 15% of the 35% val-
ue-added threshold. Bhala, supra note 157, at 178.
214. The cost or value of materials produced in any current AGOA beneficiary or any
former AGOA beneficiary that has signed a free trade agreement with the United States may
count toward value-added thresholds. Id. at 178-82. However, AGOA does not allow benefi-
ciary countries to count processing completed in other beneficiaries toward this threshold. Raj
Bhala, in particular, has argued that permitting cumulation of processing costs could increase
utilization of preferences and lead to further regional integration. See id. at 179.
215. Eligibility for bilateral cumulation is extended to EU, Norwegian, Swiss, and Turk-
ish components. See Commission Regulation 1063/2010, supra note 170, pmbl. (13), art.
85(1), 2010 O.J. (L 307) at 3, 11.
216. Four regional cumulation groups are recognized by the EU: Group I (ASEAN
member countries), Group H (Andean Community and Central American Common market
countries and Panama), Group III (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation member
states), and Group IV (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay). Id. pmbl. (11), art. 86(1),
2010 O.J. (L 307) at 2, 11. The EU regional cumulation provisions also allow Group I
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Agricultural products processed in certain ways are not eligible for bilateral
cumulation 217 and "certain sensitive products" are excluded from regional
cumulation. 218 In addition, a beneficiary country may not cumulate compo-
nents when the components would face a higher tariff if shipped directly
from the originating country.
219
While the divergent structure of preference-granting countries' regimes
makes it difficult to make sweeping recommendations, a survey of the EU
and U.S. rules of origin demonstrates at least six ways in which preference-
granting countries could make their rules of origin more user friendly and
development oriented. First, rules of origin should allow origin determina-
tions to be satisfied through more than one method. Second, rules of origin
should permit cumulation with free trade agreement signatories. Third, rules
of origin should encourage the use of simplified origin determinations.
Fourth, rules of origin should permit extended cumulation among all benefi-
ciaries. Fifth, rules of origin should permit cumulation with nonbeneficiary
countries from the same regional trade group. Lastly, stringent transfor-
mation requirements for apparel and textile products should be relaxed. As
will be discussed, some of the first five recommendations may face re-
sistance, but the resulting benefits of such reforms may be sufficient to
overcome any resistance. However, the last recommendation may be diffi-
cult to implement, at least in some countries.
First, allowing rules of origin to be satisfied through one of several
methods, as permitted in the EU scheme, could increase the flexibility of
preferential rules of origin and potentially lower the costs of complying with
the rules.220 In contrast, permitting origin determinations to be satisfied only
through value-added or local-content thresholds could increase compliance
costs. While the costs of complying with rules of origin depend on the type
of product and the production capacity of a beneficiary,22' value-added and
local-content thresholds tend to have higher compliance costs than other
methods for origin determination such as change in tariff calculations.
222
countries and Group II countries to request permission to cumulate. Id. pmbl. (15), art. 86(5),
2010 O.J. (L 307) at 3, 12.
217. Id. pmbl. (13), art. 78(1)(f)-(h), 85(1), 2010 O.J. (L 307) at 3, 10, 11.
218. Id. pmbl. (10), 2010 O.J. (L 307) at 2. For a full list of excluded products for each
region see id. Annex UI, 2010 O.J. (L 307) at 34-70.
219. Id. art. 86(3), 2010 O.J. (L 307) at 12.
220. See Brenton & Hoppe, supra note 15, at 13 (advocating for allowing exporters to
choose between value-added and change in tariff requirements); Brenton & Manchin, supra
note 196, at 15. U.S. GSP and AGOA, in contrast, require nontextile rules of origin to be satis-
fied only through a combined value-added and substantial-transformation requirement. See
ANTHONY, supra note 51, at 10.
221. See Cdline Carrire & Jaime de Melo, Are Different Rules of Origin Equally Costly?
Estimates from NAFTA 26-29 (Ctr. for Econ. Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 4437,
2004), available at http://www.cepr.org/pubs/dps/DP4437.asp.
222. See id. at 27-28 (noting that compliance costs for change in tariff classifications are
generally lower than those for value-added thresholds). Moreover, a change in tariff classifica-
tion can result in lower administrative costs, as it does not require the importer to prove the
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Moreover, U.S. and EU value-added or local-content thresholds for some
products may be difficult to meet through processing in that beneficiary
alone . 23 Thus, even if regional sourcing is not economical or practical,
manufacturers in beneficiary countries may need to incorporate components
or materials from other beneficiaries or from recognized cumulation groups
to satisfy value-added or local-content thresholds. If other methods for satis-
fying origin requirements were available, however, manufacturers would
have the ability to meet origin requirements through the most practical or
economical method.
Second, rules of origin should permit cumulation between nonrecipro-
cal-preference beneficiaries and the preference-granting country's
preferential trading partners, as this arrangement could increase integration
and economical sourcing of components.224 EU rules of origin, for instance,
allow GSP and EBA beneficiaries to cumulate components originating in
countries with which the EU has a free trade agreement. 25 This in effect
allows the beneficiary country to treat components originating in the free trade
agreement signatory as if they originated in the beneficiary country, provided
that the rules of origin in the free trade agreement would otherwise have been
met.226 This arrangement benefits both the preference-granting country and
the beneficiary country, as consumers in preference-granting countries would
origin of materials incorporated into the finished product. See Brenton & Manchin, supra note
196, at 15 ("The costs of proving origin involve satisfying a number of administrative proce-
dures so as to provide the documentation that is required and the costs of maintaining systems
that accurately account for imported inputs from different sources to prove consistency with
the technical rules."). Commentators have noted, however, that manufacturers of final goods
may benefit more from change in tariff requirements than manufacturers of intermediate
goods. See, e.g., Carrre & de Melo, supra note 221, at 27.
223. Typical value-added levels for the manufacture or processing of many products of
interest to developing countries such as chocolate, processed food and vegetables, and certain
manufactured products, for instance, do not reach the EU or U.S. threshold. See OVERSEAS
DEV. INST., CREATING DEVELOPMENT FRIENDLY RULES OF ORIGIN IN THE EU 3 (Briefing
Paper 12, 2006) (demonstrating the severity of the current regime). However, decreasing val-
ue-added thresholds in nonreciprocal preference programs below 30 or 35% percent may not
be feasible in all developed countries, particularly as such requirements appear to represent the
status quo for those countries' trade arrangements. See supra note 205 (explaining U.S.
threshold minimums); supra note 207 (explaining EU threshold minimums).
224. See Brenton & Hoppe, supra note 15, at 11.
225. AGOA also permits free trade agreement cumulation between AGOA beneficiaries
and sub-Saharan African countries that have signed a free trade agreement with the United
States. See 19 U.S.C. § 3721(b)(7) (2004); see also AGOA III, AGOA.INFO, http://agoa.info/
index.php?view=about&story=agoajthree (last visited June 7, 2012) ("Where beneficiary
countries migrate to a FTA with the US, other beneficiary countries will not be disadvantaged
as such countries will still be regarded as AGOA beneficiaries for cumulation purposes
..... "). For a list of such countries, see Free Trade Agreements, USTR,
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last visited June 7, 2012).
226. Commission Regulation 1063/2010, supra note 170, pmbl. (12), art. 86(7), 2010
O.J. (L 307) at 2, 13.
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have access to higher-quality, lower-cost products and beneficiary-country
producers would be able to source components more economically.
2 27
Third, preference-granting countries should implement simpler and more
importer-friendly origin determinations. Given global supply chains and
fragmented production processes, determining the origin of goods can be a
burdensome, costly process. 228 Moreover, rules of origin for some nonrecipro-
cal preference programs do not provide readily measurable criteria for
determining whether origin requirements have been met.229 Decisions regard-
ing whether origin requirements have been satisfied are thus often made on a
case-by-case basis at the time the product is imported, meaning that it may not
be possible to accurately predict whether products will qualify for preferential
treatment or whether they will not qualify and thus be subject to elevated tar-
iffs.23 The EU rules of origin, however, provide a template for a simpler
system that can make product origin determinations more predictable and less
costly. For regional-cumulation purposes, products imported to the EU are
deemed to originate in the last country in which the finished product was pro-
cessed, provided the processing was more than a minimal operation.231 If the
processing was minimal, the finished product is deemed to originate in the
country of the applicable regional group that has provided the highest value of
materials used to manufacture the finished product.2 32 In addition, the EU now
uses a relaxed "non-manipulation" requirement 33 to verify direct shipment234
to the EU.235 Unless customs authorities have reasonable doubts, goods im-
ported under EU nonreciprocal preference programs will be assumed to
227. See Harris, supra note 197, at 19.
228. Peter Lloyd & Donald MacLaren, Rules of Origin, in NEGOTIATING A PREFEREN-
TIAL TRADING AGREEMENT: ISSUES, CONSTRAINTS, AND PRACTICAL OPTIONS 170, 171 (Sisira
Jayasuriya et al. eds., 2009); Krishna, supra note 197, at 6.
229. See, e.g., JONES, supra note 9, at 26 (noting that U.S. GSP rules of origin do not
provide a measurable definition for the term "substantial transformation").
230. See id.
231. Commission Regulation 1063/2010, supra note 170, art. 86(4), 2010 O.J. (L 307) at
12.
232. Id.
233. "Non-manipulation" requirements prohibit products from being "altered, trans-
formed in any way or subjected to operations other than operations to preserve them in good
condition" during transit from the country of origin to the importing country. Generalised Sys-
tem of Preferences, EUROPEAN COMMISSION TAXATION AND CUSTOMS UNION,
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation-customs/customs/customs-duties/rules-originlpreferentialaricle
781 en.htm (last visited June 7, 2012).
234. Direct-shipment requirements are commonly found in nonreciprocal and reciprocal
trade arrangements. They require that products be transported directly from the beneficiary
country to the preference-granting country without entering into the commerce of another
country while en route. UNCTAD, supra note 13, at 14.




have met requirements, and systematic evidence of direct transport is no
longer required.
23 6
Fourth, preference-granting countries should permit extended cumula-
tion among all beneficiary countries. Like regional cumulation, extended
cumulation provides low-income countries with greater "flexibility in sourc-
ing inputs. '237 In addition, some have argued that extended cumulation can
promote multilateral trade liberalization and freer trade between developed
and developing countries. 231 However, it may be difficult to expand extended
cumulation to all nonreciprocal-preference beneficiaries, at least in some
countries. 23 9 Several preference-granting countries, even those that have re-
formed other aspects of their nonreciprocal preference programs, have
continued to resist extending cumulation to include a wider group of benefi-
ciaries. 240 However, such resistance may not be insurmountable. Some
preference-granting countries already permit extended cumulation 2 4  and
other preference-granting countries permit extended cumulation among
beneficiaries of regional preference programs.24 2 Some scholars have argued
that extended cumulation could at times present an attractive political
236. In case of doubt, however, customs authorities may still request evidence of com-
pliance, such as bills of lading. Id. art. 74(1)-(2), 2010 O.J. (L 307) at 8. Other recent
improvements to the EU scheme include the ability to split consignments en route to the EU,
provided such consignments remain under customs supervision in the transit country, and re-
placement of certification paperwork with statements of origin that can be transmitted
electronically. Id. pmbl. (18), (23), art. 94(1), 2010 O.J. (L 307) at 3, 4, 15.
237. PAUL BRENTON, NOTES ON RULES OF ORIGIN WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL IN-
TEGRATION ON SOUTHEAST ASIA 15-16 (2003) (paper presented at the Pacific Economic
Cooperation Council Trade Forum (Apr. 22-23, 2003)), available at http://www.pecc.org/
publications/papers/trade-papers/4_ROO/2-brenton.pdf; KATRIN ELBORGH-WOYTEK ET AL.,
REACHING THE MDGs: AN ACTION PLAN FOR TRADE 11 (1MF Staff Position Note SPN/10/14,
2010), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/spn/2010/spnI014.pdf.
238. See Harris, supra note 197, at 3-4 (arguing that extended cumulation creates an in-
centive for beneficiary countries to lower their current high tariffs on nonagricultural
products).
239. See Hatem Mabrouk, Rules of Origin as International Trade Hindrances, 5 ENTRE-
PRENEURIAL L.J. 97, 174 (2010) (noting that less competitive intermediate-goods producers
have an incentive to lobby for maintaining current cumulation rules, as extended cumulation
rules would result in loss of market share for producers currently outside the cumulation
group).
240. See Eckart Naumann, The Revised Rules of Origins for the GSP: What Has
Changed?, TRADE NEGOT. INSIGHTS, July-Aug. 2011, at 17, 18, available at http://
ictsd.org/i/news/tni/1 10513/ (mentioning that new general EU GSP rules of origin do not per-
mit extended cumulation); Harris, supra note 197, at I I (mentioning that the GSP schemes of
the EU, the United States, and Japan do not permit extended cumulation).
241. See Harris, supra note 197, at I I (mentioning that Australia and Canada permit all
beneficiaries of nonreciprocal preferences to cumulate components).
242. AGOA cumulation provisions, for instance, allow components sourced from any
other AGOA beneficiary to be included in value-added calculations. Paul Brenton & Takako
Ikezuki, The Initial and Potential Impact of Preferential Access to the U.S. Market Under the
African Growth and Opportunity Act 4 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No.
3262, 2004).
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compromise between those who want stricter rules of origin and those who
favor increased market access.143 Moreover, extended cumulation could
promote lower tariff rates in beneficiary countries, which would benefit in-
termediate component producers in preference-granting countries.
244
Fifth, rules of origin should promote cumulation between beneficiary
countries and nonbeneficiary countries that belong to the same regional
trade group.2 45 Regional cumulation can facilitate economic development, as
it allows LDCs with limited production capacity to source materials from
regional non-LDCs more effectively.246 In addition, greater regional integra-
tion can promote fragmentation, which allows a country to exploit
comparative advantages for certain sets of tasks. 247 In contrast, prohibiting
regional cumulation between beneficiaries and nonbeneficiary countries in a
common regional trade group could undermine regional integration and de-
velopment. For example, while the Republic of Guinea and Crte d'Ivoire are
both members of the Economic Community of West African States, both are
ineligible for AGOA.248 As a result, AGOA creates a disincentive for benefi-
ciary countries to source from either of these countries, as their components or
materials cannot be counted toward required value-added thresholds.
However, as nonreciprocal preference programs are often designed as a
tool to promote foreign policy, it may seem counterproductive to provide
benefits for noneligible countries without requiring policy reforms in
exchange. 249 As a compromise, rules of origin could permit regional
cumulation between beneficiary countries and current beneficiaries, former
beneficiaries that have signed a free trade agreement with the preference-
granting country, and, for a limited period of time, beneficiaries that have
recently had their benefits suspended or revoked. Such an arrangement
would promote development of more stable and predictable regional supply
chains between beneficiaries.250 Moreover, in the event that a country that
243. E.g., Harris, supra note 197, at 3-4.
244. See id. at 35 (arguing that extended cumulation would cause firms in a beneficiary
country that use intermediate goods in their production processes to pressure the beneficiary
country to make MFN tariff reductions on those goods).
245. General EU GSP and the EBA Initiative contain regional cumulation provisions that
permit cumulation between program beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries who are members of a
recognized regional trade group. UNCTAD, supra note 89, at 31. U.S. GSP contains similar
provisions. Id. at 55-56.
246. See id. at 35-36.
247. Collier & Venables, supra note 8, at 1329.
248. See Proclamation No. 8468, 74 Fed. Reg. 69,229 (Dec. 23, 2009) (declaring
Guinea ineligible); ECOWAS Member States, EcON. COMMUNITY W. AFR. STATES,
http://www.ecowas.int/ (last updated May 30, 2012).
249. In other words, cumulation with nonbeneficiary countries would promote produc-
tion in these countries since beneficiaries could source components from nonbeneficiaries and
count them toward value-added or local-content thresholds. However, nonbeneficiary coun-
tries would receive these benefits regardless of whether they implemented the policy reforms
required by the preference-granting country.
250. See BRENTON, supra note 237, at 4-5.
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supplied intermediate components lost its benefits, temporary extension of
benefits would give producers in other beneficiary countries additional time
to find alternative suppliers. Encouraging continued interactions between
final producers in beneficiary countries and intermediate suppliers in
countries that have had their benefits suspended or revoked could actually
help promote preference-granting countries' policy interests. Countries that
have lost their benefits would likely come under increased pressure from
domestic suppliers to requalify for the nonreciprocal preferences as the
limited eligibility period neared expiration.
25'
Lastly, relaxing stringent transformation requirements for apparel and
textile products could increase utilization of preferences and make
nonreciprocal programs more development friendly.25 2 Some nonreciprocal
preference programs apply stringent requirements regarding the origin of
materials used to make eligible products in non-LDC beneficiary countries.
For example, to meet origin requirements under AGOA, many non-LDC
apparel and textile products must undergo triple transformation.2153 Triple
transformation can greatly reduce the competitiveness of beneficiaries'
imports in the U.S. market.2 54 In 2002, for example, approximately fifty
percent of South African fabric exports to the United States did not qualify for
AGOA preferences .55 Manufacturers instead found it was more economical
to source fabric from third countries and export finished products under
MFN rates than comply with AGOA origin requirements.
256
251. See Harris, supra note 197, at 33 (noting that intermediate manufacturers and final
producers would exert political influence to maintain profitable trade relationships).
252. See UNCTAD, The Cost of Rules of Origin in Apparel: African Preferential Exports
to the United States and the European Union, 21, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/ITCD/TAB/40 (Policy
Issues in Int'l Trade & Commodities Study Series No. 39, 2008) (by Alberto Portugal-Perez),
available at http://archive.unctad.org/en/docs/itcdtab40_en.pdf (estimating a 300% increase in
exports from certain beneficiary countries after transformation requirements in AGOA were
relaxed).
253. See LANGTON, supra note 16, at 11-12. Apparel transformation requirements can
generally be divided into three groups: single transformation, double transformation, and triple
transformation. Single transformation, which is the least restrictive method, allows a finished
product to be assembled from fabric originating in any country. UNCTAD, supra note 252, at
1. In contrast, double transformation permits use of yam of any origin. Id. Thus, fabric used to
assemble the final product must be woven in the preference-granting country, the beneficiary
country, or a country with which cumulation is permitted. Id. Triple transformation, which is
the most restrictive method, requires that both yam and fabric used in the finished product
originate in the preference-granting country, the beneficiary country, or a country with which
cumulation is permitted. See id. at 1, 3.
254. See Aaditya Mattoo et al., The Africa Growth and Opportunity Act and Its Rules of
Origin: Generosity Undermined? 15 (Int'l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 02/158, 2002),
available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp02l58.pdf.
255. Lippoldt & Kowalski, supra note 8, at 15-16 (citing C. Stevens & J. Kennan, The
Utilisation of EU Preferences to the ACP (paper presented at the WTO Technical Seminar on
Tariff Preferences and Their Utilisation (Mar. 31, 2004))).
256. Id.
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Some preference-granting countries already allow non-LDC textile and
apparel products to qualify for preferences under double-transformation
requirements.25 ' However, across-the-board liberalization of non-LDC triple-
transformation requirements may face political resistance, at least in the
United States. 258  Although single-transformation requirements were
considered during the formation of AGOA, elements of the U.S. clothing
industry successfully lobbied for the current triple-transformation
requirement.25 9 AGOA's triple-transformation requirement benefits U.S.
businesses and industry by allowing utilization of outward-processing
arrangements, in which U.S. manufacturers focus on capital-intensive
activities like fabric production and then ship components overseas for
assembly, a relatively labor-intensive process. 260 Thus, AGOA non-LDC
textile and apparel transformation requirements, while stringent and
complicated, are already the result of a compromise between proponents of
increased market access and influential domestic clothing and textile
industry groups. 261 Unless the political influence of the clothing and textile
industry groups significantly weakens, further reforms may be difficult to
implement.
2 62
While it may be difficult to implement a sweeping liberalization of
transformation requirements, more focused reforms may be easier to
achieve. For instance, many countries have successfully incorporated single-
transformation requirements for LDC apparel products.2 63 Given the limited
257. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 1063/2010, supra note 170, pt. II, 2010 O.J. (L
307) at 49-59 (describing EU GSP textile and apparel rules for non-LDCs); Naumann, supra
note 240, at 18 (noting that non-LDCs generally remain subject to double-transformation re-
quirements).
258. See Mabrouk, supra note 239, at 118-19 (describing resistance by the U.S. clothing
lobby).
259. Id.
260. GAO, supra note 11, at 11.
261. Lesage & Kerremans, supra note 16, at 77; Mabrouk, supra note 239, at 118-19
(arguing that current triple-transformation rules reflect concerns about U.S. textile and fabric
products' lack of competitiveness compared to their Asian counterparts). Moreover, AGOA
textile and apparel provisions already retain some flexibility as a result of political compro-
mises. For instance, U.S. officials may grant duty-free and quota-free access to apparel made
from third-country fabric provided two conditions have been met: the product is both cut and
assembled in the beneficiary country, and commercial quantities of component materials can-
not be supplied by U.S. industry in a timely manner. UNCTAD, supra note 13, at 46. In
addition, AGOA includes a de minimis exception for fibers and yams not wholly formed in the
United States or another AGOA beneficiary country, provided their weight does not exceed
10% of the total weight of the assembled product. LANGTON, supra note 16, at 13.
262. See Mabrouk, supra note 239, at 118-19. See also supra note 172 and accompany-
ing text (describing how the structure of the political system in the United States makes it
susceptible to specialized interests).
263. Rules of origin for EU nonreciprocal preference programs now grant quota-free
preferences for LDC apparel products that use third-country fabric. Commission Regulation
1063/2010, supra note 170, pt. I, 2010 O.J. (L 307) at 49-59; Eckart Naumann, The EU GSP
Rules of Origin: An Overview of Recent Reforms 15 (Tralac: Trade L. Ctr. S. Africa, Working
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capacity of many LDCs, apparel products and their components can be
difficult and expensive to produce domestically. As a result, absent special
treatment, apparel products from LDCs with limited capacity are likely to
be less competitive than those from more developed beneficiaries. 264
Relaxed transformation requirements, however, can help compensate for




Drawing upon the examples of the EU and U.S. nonreciprocal
preference programs, preference-granting countries could improve the
effectiveness of their programs through implementing the following four
reforms: increasing the stability of preference programs, developing more
defined eligibility provisions, expanding product coverage, and making rules
of origin simpler and more flexible.
First, as demonstrated by the recent GSP renewal debates in the United
States, instability and unpredictability in a nonreciprocal preference pro-
gram can decrease its effectiveness and hurt manufacturers in the
Paper No. SI IWP12/2011, 2011), available at http://www.tralac.org/files/2011/Il/
Dl1WP12201 l-EU-GSP-Rules-of-Origin-Naumann-fin2l111102.pdf. AGOA also permits
use of third-country fabric in lesser-developed beneficiaries' apparel products, subject to a cap
until 2012. Summary of AGOA Apparel Provisions, ExPORT.GOV, http://www.agoa.gov/
eligibility/apparel eligibility.html (last visited June 7, 2012). AGOA apparel caps are filled on
a "first-come, first-served" basis. Once caps are filled, subsequent imports from the capped
group are subject to normal MFN tariff rates. UNCTAD, supra note 13, at 45-46. As a result,
caps have the potential to favor beneficiaries with established, large-scale production capaci-
ties over beneficiaries with nascent, smaller-scale industries. However, as fill rates have
remained below the lesser-developed country cap, the cap does not appear to have constrained
beneficiaries' utilization of the program. See AGOA Apparel Trade Quotas, AGOA.INFO,
http://agoa.info/index.php?view=trade.-stats&story=apparel-quotas (last visited June 7, 2012).
264. See UNCTAD, supra note 252, at 7. But see Mattoo et al., supra note 254, at 15
(noting that LDCs with cheap labor costs may be able to take advantage of capacity con-
straints in more developed countries).
265. UNCTAD, supra note 252, at 1. At least one preference-granting country, however,
has resisted expanding single transformation to all LDCs because of concerns that competition
from major clothing producers in Asian LDCs like Bangladesh and Cambodia could harm
producers in less competitive sub-Saharan African LDCs. See Kimberly Ann Elliot, Why Is
Opening the U.S. Market to Poor Counties So Hard?, CDG NOTES, Jan. 2012, at 2, available
at http://www.cgdev.org/files/1425850_file ElliottOpeningmarkets.pdf. In such cases, sev-
eral reforms could expand access for competitive Asian LDCs while sheltering less
competitive sub-Saharan African LDCs from harmful competition. For instance, some have
proposed capping the total number of competitive Asian LDC apparel products that are eligi-
ble for preferences. In addition, apparel exports from less competitive sub-Saharan African
LDCs are generally concentrated in a relatively small number of tariff lines while exports
from competitive Asian LDCs are more widely distributed. See supra note 176. Thus, limiting
preferences for competitive Asian LDC products in a small number of tariff lines could shelter
almost 70% of less competitive sub-Saharan African LDC products while still providing pref-
erences for a significant number of competitive Asian LDC products. See Elliot, supra. See
also supra note 176.
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beneficiary country and businesses and consumers in the preference-
granting country. Internal factors, such as partisan disagreements and budget
constraints, and external factors, such as the political nature of the WTO
process, may contribute to this instability. But while external factors can be
mitigated, internal factors may be difficult to overcome. Regardless, prefer-
ence-granting countries should still consider issuing nonbinding guidance
regarding the anticipated scope and duration of their programs.
Second, intrusive, ambiguous, and unpredictable conditions on eligibil-
ity can constrain utilization of some preferences. While it may not be
feasible to completely eliminate or dramatically modify eligibility require-
ments, it may be possible to incorporate more defined eligibility provisions.
This would improve administration of the preference program while main-
taining its effectiveness as a foreign policy tool. Eligibility for general EU
GSP and GSP-plus, for instance, is based on similar objectives as the U.S.
scheme but uses more defined standards, such as international conventions,
as a reference point. Adding a preset period of time during which benefits
are phased out for noncompliant beneficiaries would also help improve the
functionality of nonreciprocal programs.
Third, product coverage in nonreciprocal preference programs should
be expanded to cover a greater number of agricultural and processed
agricultural products from beneficiary countries. While strong political
resistance would make full liberalization difficult, other reforms are
possible. For instance, in-quota allocations could be reassigned or created
or an increased margin of preference could be granted to in-quota and
over-quota agricultural products imported under nonreciprocal preference
programs. Tariff reductions on sensitive products, rather than duty-free
treatment, may also provide a workable compromise. In addition, it may
be possible to design a special arrangement for processed agricultural
products that grants duty-free treatment provided a certain percentage of
primary agricultural inputs from the preference-granting country are
incorporated. A similar arrangement is already used for AGOA textile and
apparel products. Given significant over-quota tariff margins on processed
agricultural products in some countries, this arrangement may be able to
overcome competitiveness problems that have hampered textile and
apparel imports. In addition, any resulting loss of tariff revenue from the
above reforms could be compensated through eliminating preferential
market access for oil products, which would be unlikely to harm either the
preference-granting country's domestic consumers or producers in
beneficiary countries.
Lastly, preference-granting countries could further simplify and
improve rules of origin for their preference programs. For instance, additional
methods for satisfying origin requirements-such as a change in tariff
heading-could supplement the single, value-added requirement currently
used by some countries. In addition, preference-granting countries should
strive to simplify origin determinations. Nonreciprocal preference programs
should also permit cumulation with free trade agreement signatories and
[Vol. 33:821
Summer 2012] GSP and Development 861
nonreciprocal-program beneficiaries. While proposals to allow beneficiary
countries to cumulate materials from a nonbeneficiary country in the same
regional trade group may face initial resistance, permitting such an
arrangement for a limited period of time could actually further preference-
granting countries' policy goals. However, certain other modifications,
such as relaxing special apparel and textile rules of origin, may not be
feasible in all preference-granting countries.
Nonreciprocal preference programs have the potential to benefit both
preference-granting countries and beneficiaries. To take full advantage of
these programs, preference-granting countries should consider
implementing the reforms discussed above, which would improve the
functionality and coverage of their programs.

